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ABSTRACT

PROPAGANDA USE BY THE UNION AND CONFEDERACY IN GREAT BRITAIN
DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1862

By
Annalise L. Policicchio
August 2012

Thesis supervised by Professor Holly Mayer
At the beginning of the American Civil War, the United States (the Union)
already had international diplomatic status, whereas the Confederate States of America
wanted foreign recognition of its independence. The two governments sent agents and
propagandists across the Atlantic, in particular to Great Britain to support their
objectives. The Confederacy and the Union used various avenues, including rallies,
talking with members of Parliament, and publications to convince the British that
supporting the Confederacy was the correct action to take. The Union‘s most wellknown weapon emerged in January 1863: the Emancipation Proclamation. From the
moment President Abraham Lincoln announced in September 1862 that he would
emancipate slaves in the rebelling states, the nature of the American Civil War as viewed
by the British changed. It could no longer be viewed simply as a war for southern
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independence, for it became more explicitly about the maintenance or abolition of
slavery. For the British, slavery was a moral issue that they would never countenance.
The propagandists battled not just over slavery and its moral implications but also
over supplies, and the propaganda battle climaxed over a material issue, that of the 1862
Florida and Alabama incidents when the Confederacy sneaked the ships out of Britain.
The Union had tried desperately to convince the British government to stop the ships
from sailing, but the British government allowed them to sail. Union outrage over the
ships, subsequent military victories and the Emancipation Proclamation ultimately
outweighed the efforts of Confederate diplomats and propagandists to gain open
international recognition and support.
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Chapter 1: Historiography of Diplomacy and Propaganda in Great Britain during the
American Civil War.
Almost ninety years after the creation of the United States, the young nation was
torn apart by civil war. However, this feud between the states soon had trans-Atlantic
repercussions. Both the Union and Confederacy immediately understood that European
support, and particularly that of Great Britain, might provide key supplies, and might also
be invaluable in negotiations on the diplomatic front. Great Britain with her powerful
navy and political clout was an important potential ally to both the Union and
Confederacy. But gaining that much-needed British support was not an easy task. Due
to political issues within and between European nations, Britain was extremely reluctant
to jeopardize her domestic and international stability or her economic interests in what
many saw as an internal conflict with no easily predictable victor. On the other hand,
Britain‘s dependence on Southern cotton could lead to Confederate support. As a result,
Union and Confederate diplomats, and the propagandist who worked for or with them,
faced challenging obstacles in seeking British support for their causes.
Attempts to gain British support involved more than formal diplomacy – it
included efforts to influence public opinion. Although some diplomats engaged in such
efforts, there was a new kind of agent in this front of the war: the propagandist.
Propagandists not only disseminated news and acted as barometers of the public mood,
but also expanded their operations into more thorough and in-depth intelligence-gathering
and disinformation dissemination. Efforts to gather public support were especially vital
in Britain, where Union and Confederate agents used intelligence-gathering and the mass
production of articles and pamphlets to influence all levels of the populace, from the
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working classes to the top tiers of the government. The two sides had quite different
goals: the Confederacy strove to gain British diplomatic recognition and support for her
war effort whereas the Union wanted Britain to remain neutral, refusing the Confederacy
recognition or any foreign aid. Although both combatants strove to influence Britain‘s
stance and actions throughout the war, their agents‘ work in the first few years of the war
was especially significant because at that point, Britain appeared to be open to arguments
from both sides. But by late 1862, following the issuance of the Preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation, the prospect of British support of the Confederacy was
fading, and the continuance of British neutrality became more of a certainty.
The Alabama and Florida incidents in 1862 demonstrated the juncture of
diplomacy and intelligence-gathering by the Union to prevent the construction and
launching of these ships, a cruiser and a screw sloop-of-war, and of the use of
propaganda by the Confederacy in an attempt to influence Britain to turn a blind eye to
the construction of ships for the Confederacy. This thesis will examine attempts by
Union agents to convince Great Britain to remain neutral and the equally determined
attempts by Confederate agents to convince the British government to grant the
Confederacy diplomatic recognition, supplies, and perhaps, military intervention during
the first two years of the war. This essay emphasizes the increased role of the
propagandists in Britain, their role in the outcome of the Florida and Alabama incidents,
and thus posits the significance of propaganda to diplomatic conflict.
Academia has categorized the use of propaganda as a tool of diplomacy. It was
part of the official ambassadorial job requirements. For the United States during its civil
war, this emphasis on propaganda as a tool of diplomacy was seen in the majority of
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works published on the subject until the mid-1900s. This narrow definition focused on
revolved around the diplomats themselves and around the negotiations between
ambassadors and foreign governments. The Union chose the diplomat Charles Francis
Adams to represent its cause in Great Britain. Adams discussed the possibility of British
intervention with both Lord John Russell, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
Prime Minister Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston. These discussions illustrated the
Union‘s traditional approach to diplomacy, working from the top tiers of government
down. The Confederacy, on the other hand, sent a number of representatives to Britain.
The best-known representative was James Mason, a former senator from Virginia.
Mason tried to follow Adams‘ example by working with the British government.
Most traditional works on the American Civil War and its impact on Great Britain
emphasize one part of the conflict or a few key players. This approach to understanding
the war meant that historians generally ignored the impact that other propagandists had
on British public opinion. However, before studying the propagandists‘ roles in Great
Britain during the years 1861 and 1862, it is necessary not only to examine the myriad of
players involved in the conflict, but also the global and domestic economic impact of the
American war on Britain‘s economy. The changing historiography of the last half of the
Twentieth century illuminates that impact
Thus, for the purposes of this paper, traditionalism encompasses works that focus
on government-to-government diplomacy, military strategy and battles, or focus on one
part of the conflict or on key players. Revisionist works more closely examine the impact
of economics on the American Civil War and some begin to reexamine the importance of
propaganda. Works that may be called post-revisionist further expanded the field of
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historiography by incorporating diplomacy that was not between foreign governments
and included private discussions and a much larger examination of propaganda and its
impact on Britain. This thesis fits within the latter two categories due to its focus on
propaganda as used by both the Union and the Confederacy and its impact on the attitude
of Great Britain toward the conflict.
An early example of the traditional approach is the article ―[A] Biographical
Sketch of the Hon. Thomas H. Dudley, of Camden, N. J., Who Died April 15, 1893‖ by
William John Potts. It was published in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society in January 1895, two years after the Union intelligence agent‘s death and thirty
years after the end of the American Civil War. 1 Potts examined Dudley‘s role in Great
Britain through the eyes of a Mr. William Everett, commenting that Americans in Britain
were ―scattered, isolated, scantily informed… taunted, patronized and forced every hour
to fight the battle of our country‘s honor as truly as… the regiments at home.‖ 2 Dudley,
as the United States‘ Consul in Liverpool, was very close to Adams and fought to keep
important information from prying eyes. Liverpool, described by many, Potts included,
as a stronghold of Southern sympathy, was Dudley‘s home base where he acted as a
vanguard against Confederate influence in Britain. In Liverpool, Dudley aided Adams by
determining the validity of information that was gathered by various contacts.3 Despite
Potts‘ decision to limit his study to one person during the conflict, he did break ground
because he looked beyond Charles Francis Adams and his negotiations with the British
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William John Potts, ―Biographical Sketch of the Hon. Thomas H. Dudley, of Camden, N. J.,
Who Died April 15, 1893,‖ Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 34 (Jan., 1895), 101-103.
2

Ibid.
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government. The move beyond Adams and a focus on individual players came to
epitomize the traditionalist school.
James P. Baxter, III‘s article, titled ―The British Government and Neutral Rights,
1861-1865,‖ was published in 1928, sixty-three years after the end of the American Civil
War. Baxter‘s work examined the British government and specifically the tug-of-war
politics between the Union and Britain over British neutrality. 4 Baxter hypothesized that
one of the main reasons for Britain‘s decision to remain neutral in the American conflict
was a concern over precedents that might be set concerning neutrality rights on the high
seas in a future conflict, and this concern over precedents affected both Confederate
attempts to gain British recognition and intervention, and Union attempts to convince
Britain to remain neutral.5
Baxter‘s work focused on and praised British naval Admiral Alexander Milne,
who was dedicated to maintaining British neutrality in the American conflict.6 Milne‘s
unwavering dedication to preserving British neutrality was repeatedly emphasized and
became an example of just how effective one man‘s actions could be in historical events
and of the traditionalist school‘s narrow focus on key players or events during the
American Civil War. 7 In a move that would come to exemplify the traditionalist school,
Baxter did not concern himself with British involvement in Western Hemisphere affairs

4

James P. Baxter, 3rd, ―The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865,‖ The American
Historical Review 34 (Oct., 1928), 9-11.
5

Ibid., 10-11.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., 18. There were times when Milne had to be reminded to remain neutral as events escalated
in the waters surrounding North America and the West Indies, but as mentioned Milne continued to
maintain Britain‘s neutrality.
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beyond creating a context for Milne‘s actions; instead, Baxter‘s intent was to show
Milne‘s dedication to British neutrality, even during disagreements with Union and
Confederate commanders. One such incident involved Captain Charles Wilkes, the
Union officer who arrested Confederate diplomatic representatives James Mason and
John Slidell while they were en route to Britain aboard the British steamer Trent. Mason
was a lawyer educated at the Law School of the College of William and Mary in 1820 as
well as a senator in the United States government from 1847 to 1861, when he withdrew
to serve the Confederacy. Mason‘s cohort, John Slidell, was also a politician, but was a
businessman in private life. Slidell formerly served as a Commissioner to Mexico during
the Texas-Mexico border dispute and as a Louisiana politician. When the Southern states
seceded, Slidell sided with the Confederacy despite the fact that he was born in New
York City. 8 Following the removal of Mason and Slidell, Great Britain demanded the
release of the two men, claiming that their removal from a British ship was a violation of
British neutrality. 9 The Union eventually released the two men, who traveled on to
Europe.10 Wilkes, after the Trent affair had been resolved was reassigned to safeguard
Union commerce in the West Indies and Bahamas from attacks by the CSS Florida and
CSS Alabama in 1862.11
The Trent Affair was a Confederate propagandist‘s dream. Confederate agent
Henry Hotze railed against Wilkes, the Union commander, in his publication The Index,
8

Anonymous, ―John Slidell, (1793 – 1871)‖, Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War,
from http://www.civilwarhome.com/slidellbio.htm, (accessed April 5, 2012); ―MASON, James Murray,
(1798 – 1871),‖ Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=m000216 (accessed April 5, 2012.
9
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10

Ibid.
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Ibid., 20.
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writing that Wilkes‘ actions during the Trent affair and the failure of the Union
government to dismiss him from his post were in bad taste.12 Hotze stated that the Union
government had not acted fairly in responding to the Trent affair, since it reassigned
Wilkes rather than removing him from the Federal navy or from a position of power.
Hotze‘s comments were meant to incite anger and distrust among his readers towards the
Union government for not punishing Wilkes, for embarrassing Great Britain, and for
breaking international law. In addition, Hotze implied that the fact that the British
captain allowed Wilkes to remove Mason and Slidell from his ship was a violation to
British neutrality. 13
In the aftermath of the Trent Affair, Milne gave orders that if any of Milne‘s
officers observed a British ship being seized in neutral waters, they were not to
interfere. 14 In this way, Milne was determined to preserve Britain‘s neutrality in the
American conflict, and this stance was typical of the traditionalist school, for the focus on
Milne‘s actions obscured the bigger picture.
While the role of propaganda was relegated to the background of historical studies
for many years, it became more important with the publication of Frank Owsley‘s King
Cotton Diplomacy in 1931. This work was the beginning of the shift from traditionalist
to revisionist interpretations of the Civil War, with its introductory study of the
importance of propaganda in the conflict and an emphasis on economics.15 Owsley did

12

Henry Hotze, ―Notes on Events of the Week – America,‖ The Index: A Weekly Journal of
Politics, Literature, and New, February 11, 1864. http://www.archive.org/details/indexweeklyjourn04hotz,
82.
13

Ibid.
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an excellent job showing the connections between diplomacy, intelligence-gathering, and
propaganda, three subcategories not previously studied in conjunction. Despite its heavy
Confederate bias, as seen in the book‘s emphasis on King Cotton Diplomacy and its basis
for the Confederate diplomatic strategy, Owsley‘s focus on economics and its impact on
the diplomatic relationships between the Union, the Confederacy and Great Britain, was
important.16 In addition, Owsley was the historian who really initiated studies into
propaganda and the British public‘s opinions on the conflict, thus introducing a new
component to the study of the international dimensions of the American Civil War.17
Owsley‘s work was revisionist because it successfully introduced economics into
the study of the American Civil War, a subject that had previously been relegated to the
background. In addition, Frank Owsley was really the first historian to explore
propaganda and its impact on Great Britain, enabling historians to look at the war on a
more social and less political level. Owsley‘s work provided a crucial reconstruction of
the world in which the Union and Confederate agents operated during the war.
―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ written by Wilbur
Devereux Jones in 1953, challenged the traditionalist view that Britain‘s Conservative
Party was sympathetic to and gave aid and support to the Confederacy. Traditionalist
historians argued that Britain‘s Conservative Party supported the Confederacy‘s call for
intervention, a view that Jones rebutted.18 While Jones noted the similarities between

15

Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States
of America, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).
16

Ibid., ix; xix.

17

Ibid., 467.

18

Wilbur Devereux Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ The
American Historical Review 58 (Apr., 1953), 527-528.
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elite British landowners and Southern planters, and the distaste the British elite had for
republican values, Jones argued that these widespread beliefs were not enough to enable
the traditionalists to argue that British Conservatives hoped for Southern victory. Indeed.
Jones argued that new sources, such as the Disraeli Papers, indicated that Conservative
sympathy for the Confederacy was not as strong as previously believed. 19 Jones
contended that the new sources opened avenues of research that were previously
untouched, and that the previous works declaring that the British Conservatives favored
intervention on behalf of the Confederacy were faulty. In criticizing previous works,
Jones emphasized that the Disraeli Papers in no way affirmed Conservative allegiance to
one side or the other.20
Furthermore, Jones highlighted the internal divisions within the British
government over the correct action to take during the war. Jones emphasized how the
analysis of public opinion and overall reactions to the war impacted the British
government‘s ability to remain neutral. He noted that Lord John Russell commented in
1862 that much, if not all of the British government, sympathized with the Confederacy
(something traditionalist interpretations picked up on and emphasized), but later he – and
the entire government – came under pressure to switch their support to the Union and
remain neutral, an idea not often accentuated until the traditionalists gave way to the
revisionists.21 Furthermore, how could an observation of Ralph Earle, a former member
of Parliament, written in a letter to Disraeli that ―we [the British] shall be Southern, more

19

Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 527.

20

Ibid.

21

Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 529
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or less, sooner or later‖ have any truth, given Britain‘s aversion to slavery, and given that
the root cause of the American Civil War was slavery?22 How could Britain justify any
type of intervention on behalf of the Confederacy? 23 Therefore, Jones‘ work moved
beyond the traditional interpretation that the British Conservatives were in favor of
intervention on the side of the Confederacy by providing new evidence of societal
divisions that opened the way for others to examine how American agents tried to use
those divisions.
Richard Greenleaf‘s article ―British Labor against American Slavery‖ was
published a few months after Wilbur Jones‘ piece and addressed the role of propaganda
in a limited way. 24 This article was one of the first to comment on American concern for
British public opinion during the war. Greenleaf observed that Adams attended a
convention hosted by John Bright, British abolitionist and reformer, and took notes on the
speeches presented there, among them speeches by Bright and Karl Marx. Both Adams
and Marx were also present at a Trades Union meeting in 1863 - Adams to analyze Bright
and Marx to present his views. Adams saw and described forces at work that shaped
history, whereas Marx saw another way in which to influence the world ―in the direction
of freedom and equality.‖25 Their audience was composed of artisans, laborers and
members of London‘s trade societies, who wanted to hear the speakers‘ opinions on the

22

Wilbur Jones, ―The British Conservatives and the American Civil War,‖ 534. Ralph Earle
wrote two letters to Disraeli prior to the opening of Parliament in 1863, the halfway point of the American
Civil War. The first letter was written in late July 1862, and the second in early February 1863.
23

Ibid.

24

Richard Greenleaf, ―British Labor against American Slavery,‖ Science & Society 17 (Winter,
1953), 42-43.
25

As quoted in Ibid., 42-43.
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war. During his speech to the Trades Union meeting in March, 1863, Bright compared
the two American combatants, with a specific reference to the ―honoured‖ position of
laborers in the Union, and the degraded position of laborers (slaves) in the Confederacy.
Here Bright appealed directly to the British aversion to slavery.26 Clearly, a number of
trade unions were interested in supporting the Union, and Bright‘s speech itself was
obviously propaganda, since it emphasized the worthiness of the Northern cause.
Frenise A. Logan‘s ―India—Britain‘s Substitute for American Cotton, 18611865‖ connected Britain‘s empire to the nation‘s attitudes towards the American Civil
War. 27 British investors and manufacturers had been worried for some time about their
dependence on American cotton and had endeavored to find alternate sources of supply.
Many thought that India was the solution. Logan emphasized that the manufacturers‘
search for alternative supplies was not driven solely by economic factors, but by concern
over the ―immorality of slavery.‖ 28 Abolitionists emphasized the immorality of slavery
as well as the British dislike of the institution – it had been abolished throughout the
empire in 1832 – in an attempt to further encourage British neutrality. The Confederacy
knew that British concerns over the morality of slavery and alternate cotton supplies were
a threat to its ―king Cotton‖ diplomatic strategy, a view that became a staple of the
revisionist school.
Harriet Owsley also wrote about the American Civil War, but focused on one
person and his accomplishments: Henry Sanford, a Union propagandist, spy and the
26

As quoted in Greenleaf, ―British Labor against American Slavery,‖ 45.

27

Frenise A. Logan, ―India—Britain‘s Substitute for American Cotton, 1861-1865,‖ The Journal
of Southern History 24 (Nov., 1958), 472.
28

Ibid.
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United States minister to Belgium. However, Harriet Owsley‘s article, published in
1961, also bridged the gap between traditionalist and revisionist studies, for while she
focused on one facet of the American conflict, she also emphasized the broader picture,
emphasizing Sanford‘s connections to Adams and Union Secretary of State William
Seward.29 Owsley‘s focus was on Sanford‘s spy network, which he utilized to gather
crucial information on the Confederate propagandists‘ movements, information that he
also used to boost his own propaganda efforts.30 Owsley presented the Union in a
positive light, an opposite view from that of her husband Frank Owsley, and her work
was a combination of traditionalism and revisionism. 31
The revisionist school‘s continued growth was seen with Henry Blumenthal‘s
―Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities,‖ published in
1966. Blumenthal‘s work took a different look at Confederate diplomacy and the
realities behind it.32 Blumenthal began his study by stating that the Confederacy pursued
a course that followed ―[the] popular notions and attitudes‖ prevalent in the South and
ended up with a course of diplomacy that turned out, in hindsight, to be disastrous.33
These ―popular notions and attitudes‖ were the beliefs among the Southern populace that
the war was going to be short, that the North would eventually let the Confederacy
secede, and that Great Britain would quickly recognize the Confederacy because of its
29

Harriet Chappell Owsley, ―Henry Shelton Sanford and Federal Surveillance Abroad, 18611865,‖ The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (September 1961), 225-226. Both Adams and Seward
eventually came to believe that Sanford was a loose cannon because his temper often overcame his logic.
This led to his removal as head of the Union‘s intelligence network in Britain.
30

Ibid., 226.

31

Ibid.

32

Henry Blumenthal, ―Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities,‖ The
Journal of Southern History 32 (May, 1966), 151.
33

Ibid.
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reliance on Confederate cotton, and these beliefs ultimately negatively impacted the
Confederacy‘s diplomatic goals.34 Blumenthal questioned the overall effectiveness of the
Confederacy‘s diplomacy and the reasoning behind it, pointing out repeatedly that public
opinion had too much of an impact on Southern diplomacy. For example, Confederate
leaders were very eager to find foreign allies, and Blumenthal implied that this eagerness
translated into a willingness to accept secondhand assurances that external aid was
certain, a clear case of the Southern government accepting favorable information without
verifying its accuracy. 35 This view ran counter to previous studies because Blumenthal
focused on more than just the role of economic issues in the quest for foreign aid,
suggesting that the ultimate failure of Confederate diplomacy did not result solely from
economic issues, but also from Southern overconfidence. 36
Joseph M. Hernon, Jr.‘s 1967 study further stressed the importance of British
public opinion during the American Civil War, arguing that the standard interpretation
was too narrow to reach a full understanding of the total picture. This interpretation was
mainly based on two sources, and this resulted in a narrow and inflexible interpretation of
the subject.37 His interpretation of British sympathies, however, utilized a number of
more recent sources in order to make the point that British sympathies were divided
across both social and economic lines. This division ensured that diplomats and
34

Blumenthal, ―Confederate Diplomacy,‖ 151.

35
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36
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Adams‘ Great Britain and the American Civil War (1925) and Donaldson Jordan and Edwin J. Pratt‘s
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propagandists from both the Union and Confederacy would work tirelessly to change
British opinion. 38 Hernon‘s work falls nicely into the revisionist school, for it becomes
the foundation for a number of articles that not only continued the revisionist school but
it also aided in the academic switch to the post-revisionist school of thought.
Mary Ellison‘s work, Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil
War and Douglas A. Lorimer‘s article titled ―The Role of Anti-Slavery Sentiment in
English Reactions to the American Civil War‖ both examined British society and its
divisions during the American Civil War. Ellison posited that the British middle class
did not fully support the Union for several reasons: supporting the Confederacy was
probably the quickest way to obtain raw cotton; the Emancipation Proclamation was seen
as somewhat hypocritical, since it still allowed slavery in the border states; many felt that
a Confederate victory would likely lead to the end of southern slavery; and finally, many
British believed that American southerners had a fundamental right to choose their own
form of government.39 Ellison also refuted the notion that the lack of agitation from the
Lancashire workers signified support for the Union, and argued that it cannot be assumed
that the workers were sympathetic towards the North. Furthering her point, Ellison stated
that if the workers supported Lincoln and the North, the evidence was not the lack of
verbal protest; in fact, Ellison argued that many wanted the South to win and gave the
Confederacy their moral backing. Ellison believed that the workers felt only mistrust for
the Union, a feeling that deepened as the war progressed. 40
38

Hernon, ―British Sympathies in the American Civil War,‖ 366-367.

39

Mary Ellison, Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1972), ix.
40

Ibid. Although Ellison never directly stated that the Lancashire workers refused to support the
North, her view runs against the grain of later historians such as R. J. M. Blackett and Brian Jenkins, both
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Lorimer, acknowledged Ellison‘s findings, but focused more on the overall
impact of anti-slavery sentiment on public opinion. He examined how the issue of the
morality of slavery was viewed by the British public, a view that was ever-changing as
the British social classes grew ever more divided.41
Ellison, Hernon and Lorimer all agreed that the English public was deeply divided
over which side to support in the American conflict. Anti-slavery sentiment was a
difficult obstacle for Confederate propagandists, especially when coupled with the
growth of abolitionism in Britain and the growing concern with the immorality of human
bondage. 42 These moral sentiments became a rallying cry for Union supporters and
increased the difficulty experienced by the Confederacy in gaining British support.
The complexities of Britain‘s Civil War diplomacy can be seen in Lord John
Russell‘s concern with the consequences that Britain would face in the aftermath of the
American conflict. Paul H. Scherer‘s article titled ―Partner or Puppet? Lord John Russell
at the Foreign Office, 1859-1862‖ presented Russell as a misrepresented man whose
naturally shy personality was overpowered by the dominant personality of Lord
Palmerston.43 Traditionalists viewed Lord Russell as nothing more than Lord
Palmerston‘s puppet, while revisionists viewed Russell as a leader with a strong foreign
policy background.44 The post-revisionists argued that while Russell may have done

of whom returned to the traditionalist stance, arguing that the workers supported the North and/or remained
neutral.
41

Douglas A. Lorimer, ―The Role of Anti-Slavery Sentiment in English Reactions to the
American Civil War,‖ The Historical Journal 19 (Jun., 1976), 405-406.
42

Ibid., 406.
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Paul H. Scherer, ―Partner or Puppet? Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office, 1859-1863,‖
Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 19 (Autumn, 1987), 347.
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Palmerston‘s bidding on occasion, he also used Palmerston to gain support for his own
policies. 45 New collections helped Scherer to compile a much larger picture of what was
going in Britain during the war, and his article not only focused on Russell during the
American Civil War but also on his relationship with Lord Palmerston, which in turn
examined Palmerston‘s involvement in Britain‘s decision to remain neutral and what the
consequences of that choice meant for both the British public and the government
officials.
Both David G. Surdam‘s ―Cotton‘s Potential as Economic Weapon: The
Antebellum and Wartime Markets for Cotton Textiles‖ and Sven Beckert‘s
―Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in
the Age of the American Civil War‖ are firmly entrenched in the post-revisionist school,
for both built upon and added to older arguments by turning to new evidence that they
used to better understand propaganda‘s role in Britain. Economic in scope, Surdam‘s
article examined how cotton grown throughout the British Empire could alleviate British
dependence on Confederate cotton.46 Ten years after Surdam‘s composition came
another post-revisionist work by Sven Beckert titled ―Emancipation and Empire:
Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American
Civil War.‖ Beckert asserted that the international cotton investors stepped up their
search for new cotton sources, based on their fears that their total dependence on
American, and specifically, Confederate, cotton sources could lead to economic

44

Scherer, ―Partner or Puppet? Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office,‖ 347.

45

Ibid.

46

David G. Surdam, ―Cotton‘s Potential as Economic Weapon: The Antebellum and Wartime
Markets for Cotton Textiles,‖ Agricultural History 68 (Spring, 1994), 122.

16

disaster.47 Like Logan before him, Beckert noted the heavy investment needed for India
to even approach replacing the American South as Britain‘s chief supplier of cotton.
India was the only nation that could come close to matching the American South‘s
production.
Steven Siegel‘s article on British diplomacy during the first two years of the Civil
War was also post-revisionist in nature due to its focus on both international and
domestic diplomacy. 48 Published in The Concord Review in the fall of 2005, Siegel
focused on the basic tenets of British diplomacy and on Confederate efforts to convince
the island nation that recognition of the Confederacy was a better course of action than
neutrality. In addition, Siegel‘s exploration of the social class structure of mid-nineteenth
century Britain was crucial because it reinforced the idea that propaganda might have
greatly affected the outcome of the American Civil War. Confederate propagandists knew
that it would be easier to gain recognition if the populace petitioned the government;
therefore, the British public and government were inundated with numerous requests,
pamphlets, publications, and information dissemination from both Union and
Confederate sympathizers to either convince the British government that intervention was
better than neutrality or vice versa. 49
Another example of the post-revisionist school was The Union, the Confederacy,
and the Atlantic Rim, a collection of short essays edited by Robert May. This collection
47
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provided a more international examination of the Civil War, for as May commented in
his introduction the main purpose of this collection was to introduce foreign nations into
the formula of the American Civil War, showcasing the roles that these countries played
and the urgency that Union and Confederate representatives felt in attempting to gain
foreign aid.50 Of importance here is that the essays also explored the influence that
British public opinion had on the British government over the issue of intervention.

51

One of the essay authors, R. J. M. Blackett, examined how cotton, African Americans,
slavery and public opinion all acted as factors in the propaganda battle to gain British
support.52
Thomas Boaz‘s Guns for Cotton: England Arms the Confederacy examined the
aid that private British citizens gave the Confederacy. Boaz wanted to show how the
dedication of a few enabled the Confederacy to gain desperately needed arms, clothing
and munitions, as well as limited financial support.53 Boaz‘s book connects the
revisionist school of economic thought begun by Frank Owsley and the post-revisionist
trend of emphasizing international connections.
Dean Mahin‘s work, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the
American Civil War, combined revisionist and post-revisionist analysis. Mahin asserted
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that Abraham Lincoln played a much larger role in diplomacy than previously thought. 54
Contrary to previous schools of thought that emphasized Secretary of State William
Seward‘s role, Mahin showed that Lincoln worked with Seward to disguise diplomatic
maneuvers in order to keep the Confederacy guessing.55 Mahin also examined the CSS
Florida and CSS Alabama incidents that involved the Confederacy‘s attempts to evade
international law to obtain arms for the war effort. Mahin analyzed the role of
propaganda in these two case studies, particularly the Alabama incident, with an
emphasis on the activities of Union agent Henry Sanford and his attempts to persuade
Britain to remain neutral.56
Henry Sanford was not the only Union agent in Europe and Great Britain, for
Thomas Haines Dudley had just as much, if not more, influence on events that occurred
in the island nation. David Hepburn Milton‘s Lincoln’s Spymaster: Thomas Haines
Dudley and the Liverpool Network differed from William John Potts‘ article in a number
of ways, yet Milton‘s work acted as a connector between the works of Potts and Milton.57
Milton took the traditionalist route in that he wrote a detailed examination of one
key player, yet he differed from Potts because he did not isolate Dudley‘s actions from
the war‘s international aspect. Rather, Milton portrayed Dudley‘s accomplishments from
an international perspective while showcasing the overseas theater of intelligence and
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diplomacy in Britain. 58 Dudley‘s role as the Consul of Liverpool gave him access to the
local British populace. Contradicting Potts‘ assertion that Dudley was rather isolated
from his fellow Union agents, Milton showed that Dudley worked closely with Charles
Francis Adams. Dudley ferreted out information about the Confederate agents stationed
in Liverpool and elsewhere in Britain and relayed that information to Adams. This work
thus combines revisionist and post-revisionist foci and interpretations.
The impact of the Union‘s blockade on Britain‘s mills in various towns and
districts was closely examined in Rosalind Hall‘s article ―A Poor Cotton Weyver:
Poverty and the Cotton Famine in Clitheroe.‖ Hall asserted that as the American Civil
War increased in length and the Union‘s blockade tightened its hold on Confederate
ports, raw cotton supplies became increasingly scarce in Britain. 59 This work observed
that past historians concentrated on different aspects of the cotton famine, such as the
relationship between increasing levels of poverty and the tightening of the blockade, or
how the high level of donations to unemployed mill workers signified benevolent
treatment. In this post-revisionist work, Hall took into account both the economic impact
of scarce cotton supplies and closing mills and the effects on the unemployed triggered
by different methods of charitable aid distribution, a concept that incorporated both
traditionalist and revisionist views of the situation in the mill towns during Britain‘s
cotton famine. 60
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Howard Jones‘ Blue and Gray Diplomacy is post-revisionist in that it broadens
the study of the American Civil War, by examining the foreign relations of the Union and
Confederacy from both American and European perspectives. It shows how
interconnected the diplomacy of the war truly was. 61 Jones‘ emphasis on the
international dimensions of the American Civil War followed Mahin‘s work, comparing
and contrasting the diplomatic methods of both the Union and Confederacy.
Joining Howard Jones in the most recent spate of interpretations is Amanda
Foreman and her work, A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil
War. As the title heralds, Foreman focuses specifically on Great Britain‘s impact on the
American conflict. Foreman stated that although she had previously been aware of the
polarization that the American war had caused among the British populace, she was
surprised to learn that there were many elite Liberals in Britain who supported the
Confederacy. 62 Foreman‘s work went above and beyond previous works that examined
Britain‘s role by exploring the entire Anglo-American relationship from antebellum times
until just after the war ended in 1865. In this manner, Foreman successfully traced the
evolution of British and American relations throughout the war, examining the
difficulties inherent in gaining Britain‘s agreement for either neutrality or intervention, a
task that has become a hallmark of post-revisionism. Britain‘s internal social divisions
had not been previously linked to foreign influence, making this work rather novel; in

61

Howard Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 2-3.
62

Amanda Foreman, A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War (New
York, New York: Random House, 2010), xxiii.

21

this respect, the Anglo-American world shifted and the relationship between the two
countries was never the same.63
The works above show how vibrant the study of Civil War diplomacy has been.
This thesis, in turn, offers a contribution to the continuing post-revisionist examination of
the effects of propaganda and public opinion to diplomatic engagements, but in particular
on the outcome of the Alabama incident of 1862. This study focuses on the use of
propaganda in Great Britain by the Union and the Confederacy so as to assess the overall
impact of these efforts on Britain during the first two years of the war.
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Chapter 2: The Development of King Cotton Diplomacy
In 1860, just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, the American South was the
dominant global producer of raw cotton, and Great Britain was the dominant global
manufacturer of cotton textiles.1 These economic realities set the agenda for Confederate
diplomatic efforts as the conflict between North and South grew ever more certain. For
Great Britain, the need for a constant supply of raw cotton to feed her massive textile
industry was absolute. Britain had no source of raw cotton equal to that of the southern
United States. For the South, this perceived British need for southern cotton became the
driving force behind her efforts to gain foreign recognition and aid. Believing that she
had Great Britain ―over a barrel,‖ so to speak, the Confederacy ultimately based her
foreign policy on ―King Cotton.‖
The cotton industry emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a major factor in
the world economy due to both its size and financial worth, with an estimated 20 million
workers involved in the industry.2 The United States became the leading cotton
producer, and her two largest customers were Great Britain and France, with the former
importing 658,451,796 pounds of raw cotton from the American South in 1853,
increasing within five years to 732,403,840 pounds, or about 75 percent of the global
cotton yields for that year.3 These figures demonstrated British dependency on the
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American South for almost three-quarters of her cotton, a dependency the South would
attempt to exploit.4
Internationally, cotton was the primary ingredient for the world‘s burgeoning
textile industry, one fueled by unparalleled growth in cotton yields. Whole regions of the
world, such as Lancashire, England, and Massachusetts mill towns, were dependent on
cotton shipments for both manufacturers‘ profits and the livelihoods of the mill workers.5
European nations grew wealthy from importing raw cotton and returning it to the
international market as a multitude of manufactured products, whereas increasing raw
cotton and numerous raw materials exports provided the basis for rapid antebellum
economic growth in the United States.6
By the late 1850s, American cotton production outranked all international rivals,
among them British India. American production accounted for an estimated ―seventyseven percent of the 800 million pounds that Britain consumed, ninety percent of the 192
million pounds imported by France and as much as ninety-two percent of the 102 million
pounds manufactured in Imperial Russia.‖7 By 1860, United States cotton exports to
Great Britain were worth about $150 million, with the island nation‘s cotton consumption
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more than four times that of the North American textile mills. 8 By the eve of the Civil
War in 1860, the amount of cotton produced in the American South had risen to more
than 4.5 million bales. 9
Great Britain worried about her dependence on southern cotton. As early as 1840,
Britain recognized the inherent danger of becoming dependent on one source of cotton,
and she initiated a series of attempts to increase the cotton yields from the Indian
subcontinent to offset American imports. The London Economist remarked on the issue
of Britain‘s need to find alternate sources of cotton:
We are not surprised that the future supply of cotton should have engaged the
attention of Parliament . . . It is a question of importance of which can not well
be overrated, if we refer only to the commercial interests which it involves, or
to the social comfort or happiness of the millions who are now dependent upon
it for their support.10
The Economist further noted that in 1840, the amount of cotton imported by Great Britain
was an estimated 592,000,000 pounds, but in the span of eighteen years, that amount had
risen to roughly 900,000,000 pounds, an increase of about 50 percent.11 These numbers
spurred the British determination to find alternate sources of cotton.
The British press shared these fears of becoming too dependent on one nation for
cotton. On June 9, 1855, the London Economist remarked that the demand for larger
cotton shipments had not been met with a corresponding supply. 12 Then, on September

8

Thomas Boaz, Guns for Cotton: England Arms the Confederacy (Shippensburg, Pennsylvania:
Burd Street Press, 1996), 2; David G. Surdam, ―Cotton‘s Potential as Economic Weapon: The Antebellum
and Wartime Markets for Cotton Textiles,‖ 68 (Spring, 1994), 125.
9

Boaz, Guns for Cotton, 2.

10

As cited in Christy, Cotton is King, 62.

11

As cited in Ibid, 62. The issue of the London Economist referenced was February 12, 1859.

12

London Economist, issued June 9, 1855, as cited in Ibid., 61, 63.

25

1, 1855, this same newspaper observed the American crop was smaller than usual, and
due to the continuing danger of American cotton crop fluctuations, it said Great Britain‘s
continual reliance on the United States posed an economic danger, and an actual
American crop failure would be disastrous for Britain‘s economy. 13 A lack of raw cotton
would force mills and factories to close, leading to the unemployment of thousands of
mill workers. The fact that a large part of the British workforce relied on the textile
industry for their livelihoods made social revolution due to unemployment in the cotton
industry not only terrifying, but entirely possible. 14 Therefore, Britain‘s fears of the
consequences of depending upon one source for the majority of its imports were
legitimate. Clearly, Britain had to find additional sources for cotton imports, and the
logical place to look for increased cotton production was the British colony of India.
Britain had long imported Indian cotton, but the amounts were much smaller than
those imported from the American South. Isaac Watts, author of The Cotton Supply
Association: Its Origin and Progress and a longtime student of the issue of cotton supply,
observed that the British hoped that India ―would prove the land of promise, and fully
realise our hopes.‖15 In hopes of increasing Indian cotton exports, Britain sent agents to
India to gather information and find ways to turn India into a large enough cotton
exporter to offset American shipments.16 The British House of Commons received a
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report dated February 29, 1848, concerning the obstacles to enhancing Indian cotton
production, among them soil quality, the Indian revenue system, and the lack of profit for
the cultivators.17 Watts reported on India‘s introduction of foreign strains of cotton
(especially American and Egyptian) including the American variety known as the ―New
Orleans,‖ grown in Dharwar, in the Southern Mahratta country of the Indian
subcontinent.18 The climate in this part of India was similar to the American South, since
it had more rainfall and a higher elevation thanks to the Ghats (mountains).19 It was
hoped that the similar climates would allow for larger cotton yields and thus larger Indian
exports.
Not only the British politicians, but also the merchants and cotton manufacturers
knew how important cotton imports were to the British economy, and this knowledge led
to the creation of the Cotton Supply Association. Founded in 1857 by the cotton
manufacturers of Lancashire, its goal was to try to gather as much information as possible
on cotton cultivation in any country that had the climate and soil needed for crop
growth.20 To encourage a switchover to Indian cotton, the Manchester Chamber of
Commerce, a collection of concerned cotton manufacturers and merchants, met on
January 19, 1850, to consider ―whether any course was open whereby an enlarged
commercial intercourse with India could be promoted, and especially an increased supply
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of cotton obtained‖ in order to lessen British dependence on American cotton. 21 The first
resolution passed by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce called for a consideration of
all other cotton producers in hopes of finding a suitable supplement for American
cotton.22 While this was an excellent suggestion, and other areas of the world possessed
good climates for growing cotton, producers such as Brazil, the West Indies, and Egypt
did not harvest enough cotton to make a significant impact.23
This fact, when added to the even smaller cotton supply from British India,
created a situation in which Britain was unable to break free of its reliance on American
cotton. The London Economist commented on the lack of substantial increase in cotton
shipments from India to British ports, stating that:
From British India the supply is relatively shorter than from the United States. It
fails us more than that of the States [American South], and the fact is rather
unfavorable to the speculations of those who wish to make us independent of the
States, and dependent chiefly on our own possessions. … In 1855, when we have a
short supply from other quarters, India has sent us one-third less than in 1853.‖24
The crux of the situation was this: if Britain‘s empire was unable to supply a sufficient
amount of cotton to supply the mother country‘s cotton industry, then Britain could not
break her dependence on American cotton.25 Britain‘s dependency on the United States
for cotton was thus a crucial factor in its relations with its former colonies – and it would

21

Watts, The Cotton Supply Association, 10.

22

In an interesting side note, Watts does not mention Lancashire as being particularly concerned
with Britain‘s reliance on one nation for cotton. He remarked that the Manchester Chamber of Commerce
itself was also taken aback at the confidence with which Lancashire operated, particularly when the
majority of her domestic economic market was reliant in one form or another on the cotton trade.
23

As cited in Christy, Cotton is King, 63.

24

As cited in Ibid., 61.

25

As cited in Ibid.

28

become a factor that American southerners tried to exploit in their attempts to achieve
their independence.
Joining with the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, the Cotton Supply
Association adopted the Chamber‘s goal of encouraging cotton growth in every suitable
part of the world in order to offset the dependence on imported America cotton.26
Domestically, the Cotton Supply Association petitioned the British Parliament
concerning the issue. In the petition, the Association stated that it was Parliament‘s duty
to ―adopt the most prompt and effectual measures for rendering India capable of
furnishing an ample supply of improved cotton.‖27 The petition further stated that a
substantial investment was needed to create the necessary infrastructure to enable India to
become a substantial cotton supplier. This task, the Cotton Supply Association noted,
was the responsibility of the British government.28 Additionally, the Cotton Supply
Association‘s petition to the House of Commons listed a number of reasons why the
Association felt the need for large monetary investments in India, all of which dealt with
the advantages that American cotton growers possessed over their Indian rivals. Two of
those American advantages were access to more capital than India, and easy access to
both water and land-based communications and infrastructure not enjoyed in India. 29
Both the Cotton Supply Association and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce
sent agents abroad to gather first-hand evidence of the results of British investment in
26
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India and of the attempts at increasing cotton yields globally. Although the resulting
reports were optimistic, they also noted several obstacles yet to be overcome, one of
which concerned finding the correct type of land and climate for growing cotton.
Investigative reports stated that cotton could be grown anywhere in temperate and/or near
tropical regions of the globe, and for the British Empire, upon which the Sun never set,
this meant multiple prospective regions. 30 Accordingly, British consuls in those regions
where it might be possible to grow cotton were asked to distribute seeds to farmers and to
do everything in their power to increase the crop‘s growth, all with mixed results. 31
India became a proving ground of sorts for Britain in terms of finding another
source of cotton and demonstrating that the necessary amounts of cotton could be
produced without the use of slaves. An issue of the London Economist, dated February
12, 1859, stated that India was certain to become a successful cotton producer due to the
availability of inexpensive land and large pools of cheap labor.32 The Economist
continued by asserting that whatever financial sacrifice was needed, including investment
in transportation and other infrastructure, should be done enthusiastically, for it was the
only way for India to become a large-scale cotton producer. This, in turn, would not only
Increase the amount of cotton available globally, but also lower prices, thereby benefiting
those nations who imported large amounts of the fiber.33
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In the decade prior to the American Civil War, the amount of cotton exported
from India did indeed rise, evidence that British investment and focus on the subcontinent
was somewhat successful, but the American South also continued to increase its yields.
The English Board of Trade‘s annual report for 1859 corroborated this fact, for it showed
that even though Britain had spent over twenty years investing in India‘s cotton trade,
only about 60,000,000 pounds were exported from the Southeast Asian subcontinent, a
difference of only 10,000,000 pounds when compared to the total amount exported in
1800.34 Britain had obtained an increase of less than 20 percent in the face of continual
demand for cotton and the United States‘ increasingly high-yield cotton harvests since
1800.35
Watts estimated that by 1860, the United States produced roughly 85 percent of
the cotton that Britain imported for use in her mills and factories, despite the increased
amounts of Indian cotton exports.36 In fact, when the numbers for 1860 were examined,
Britain imported 562,738 bales of cotton from India, each weighing 400 pounds, a decent
amount, but only about 21 percent of the cotton Britain imported from the United States
during the same year.37 Clearly, American cotton exports continued to dominate.
By April 1861, after years of attempts by various groups in Britain and throughout
the British Empire to increase Indian cotton production, the London Economist publicly
conceded defeat, telling its readers that Indian cotton was never going to be able to
compete with its American cousin. The Economist cited a number of reasons for this
34
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defeat, primary among them that Indian raw cotton ―loses more in the process of spinning
[than American raw cotton].‖38 In other words, when Indian cotton was spun into
manufactured products and yarn, the combination of large amounts of generated waste
and the increased time it took to spin undermined profits. The same machinery,
according to the Economist, produced ―ten to twenty percent more American yarn than
Surat (Indian) yarn.‖39 Some of the reasons behind the excess waste were that Indian
cotton possessed shorter fibers and a higher dust content when compared to American
cotton, and the manufactured cloth was also thinner, a flaw that bolstered the continued
popularity of American cotton.40
In addition, calls made for investments to improve the efficiency of the Indian
transportation system to provide for easier shipment of cotton from India to Britain and to
lower the cost of transporting Indian cotton had not been successful. The British
government looked to both domestic parties and its colonial governors in India for plans
to improve transportation systems and obtain more investment. Watts related how a
proposal had been submitted to the British government and the East India Company in
1857 ―to raise and apply a sum of four millions annually, for five years, in such public
works as… necessary, for the development of the industry and commerce of India.‖ 41
The British government considered the proposal, but did not agree to it or subsequent
propositions, such as one that would have ―improve[ed] the quality, and reduce[d] the

38

As cited in Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 5.

39

Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey‘s, 2000), 83; Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 5
40

Mahin, One War at a Time, 83.

41

Watts, The Cotton Supply Association, 17-18.

32

cost of cotton exported from India to this country [Britain]… by an estimated…
£286,000.‖42
However, some, such as the Cotton Supply Association, were unwilling to give up
on India. In 1861, the Cotton Supply Association once again suggested that the British
government open ―the navigation of the River Godavery as a means of access to the vast
cotton fields of Berar.‖43 It also remarked that India merely needed Britain to direct her
―skill, enterprise and capital… to the development of the agricultural resources of India,
that …would speedily be rendered capable of supply cotton of as good quality as that
now furnished by the restricted and costly slave labour of the United States.‖ 44 Its
exhortations appeared to fall on deaf ears.
During all this time, war loomed larger in the United States. It came as no
surprise that when war did erupt, the relationships that had underpinned the global
economics of the cotton industry became increasingly frayed. Upon the South‘s
secession, the federal government of the United States (the American North) passed the
Morrill Tariff in an attempt to protect and encourage the growth of her own industries by
imposing high duties on foreign imports.45 While still part of the Union, the South had
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prevented the tariff‘s passage because it benefitted the North‘s industrial sectors and not
the South‘s agrarian economy, and it would also have made trade more difficult for the
South, dependent as she was on imported foodstuffs and manufactured products.46
Furthermore, the tariff would also roil the British society for it would dampen Southern
demand for British manufactured goods.
Britain, recognizing that a civil war was inevitable in the United States, had been
purchasing cotton in huge amounts, so that by the time the war actually began, Britain
possessed a surplus of cotton that was so large it would take about two years to consume,
so it was therefore not in great need of Confederate cotton.47 The fact that it possessed
such a large cotton surplus was a factor in the failure of the Confederacy‘s King Cotton
Diplomacy.
Upon establishing the Confederate States of America and as war became
inevitable, the self-declared southern confederacy knew that it needed a strategy to gain
foreign recognition, and it decided to use cotton as a bargaining chip with European
nations, particularly Britain, because of their strong dependence on American cotton.

A

series of articles written by a number of different authors also fostered this belief and the
resulting diplomatic strategy. The first of these works was the anthology of books and
pamphlets, Cotton Is King and the Pro-Slavery Arguments Comprising the Writings of
Hammond, Harper, Christy, Stringfellow, Hodge, Bledsoe, and Cartwright on This
important Subject, edited by E. N. Elliot. In his work from this book, ―Cotton is King:
or, Slavery in the Light of Political Economy, Ohioan David Christy stated that in order
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to avoid bloodshed and assure the peaceful secession of the South, negotiations between
the two sections of the United States had to take place according to southern terms,
among which was the idea that ―Cotton is King.‖ 48 This phrase later became
commonplace throughout the South, repeated by politicians and masses alike. 49 The
phrase, ―Cotton is King,‖ appears to have originated in a speech given by Senator James
Henry Hammond on March 4, 1858. Hammond, responding to a speech by Senator
William Seward given the previous day, argued that the southern exports were about
twice that of the North, and this did not include another $40,000,000 in products sent to
the North. In arguing against a protective tariff, Hammond claimed that the passage of
such a tariff would be the equivalent of declaring war on cotton. Hammond ominously
warned that by not planting cotton, the South could bring about the collapse of the entire
global economy, including that of the North. Hammond proclaimed ―No, you dare not
make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king.‖50
This idea, later shortened to ―King Cotton,‖ took hold and soon many in the Confederacy

were convinced that Great Britain had no choice but to support her main cotton supplier
in this conflict. A prominent Georgian secessionist, Thomas R. R. Cobb, wrote on
February 19, 1861, ―that Great Britain, France and Russia will acknowledge us at once in
the family of nations,‖ a statement that summarized the feelings of many Southerners at
48

As cited in Christy, Cotton is King, 138. In part, this phrase also came from an examination of
the American South‘s profits from the past few decades, all of which were high and ―exceeded in value the
exports of breadstuffs and provisions to the extent of fourteen hundred and twenty-one millions of dollars!”
49

As cited in Ibid., 135-137; Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 15. Cotton Is King began as the
sole work of Christy, referenced above, but in 1860 this work was incorporated with other works by
Southern writers and slavery champions..
50

James Henry Hammond, “On the Admission of Kansas, Under Lecompton Constitution,‖ in
Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. Hammond of South Carolina,” (New York:
John F. Trow & Co., 1866), 311-322, http://www.sewanee.edu/faculty/Willis/Civil_War/documents/
HammondCotton.html (accessed February 29, 2012).

35

the beginning of the American Civil War. 51 It became a common Confederate
assumption that European nations would intervene on the side of the Confederacy if war
erupted, in order to keep their economies intact.52
Further evidence of this belief was seen in British Consul Robert Bunch‘s report
to Lord John Russell, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, concerning an encounter
on December 15, 1860, with prominent Southerner Robert Barnwell Rhett. Bunch
reported that Rhett questioned him as to the probability of the British offering support to
the Confederacy, to which Bunch replied that he had no power to comment officially on
the subject, nor could he offer an opinion on it.53 Rhett, however, was insistent and said
that the Confederacy would prefer to have Great Britain as an ally rather than enemy, a
policy that he personally believed would benefit both nations but particularly Britain,
which was still dependent on American cotton. Bunch also remarked that Rhett noted
numerous economic benefits for Britain should she ally with the South, among them an
―an interchange of commodities …which would lead to an unrestricted intercourse of the
most friendly character.‖54 Bunch attempted to alert Rhett to the folly of assuming that
Britain and other European nations would automatically support the Confederacy, but
Rhett, supremely confident in his beliefs, assured Bunch that even if slavery was an issue,
foreign recognition would come swiftly for the Southern states. Bunch pointed out that
51
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Britain would like to see the internal southern slave trade abolished, but Rhett argued that
to do so would be a de facto admission that the institution of slavery was obsolete,
something the Confederacy would never do.55 Despite Bunch‘s refusal in any way to
commit to British support of the Confederacy, Rhett believed he heard an implied
assurance that Britain would recognize the Confederacy, and his belief matched the
American South‘s firm belief that King Cotton diplomacy was the solution to the
Confederacy‘s desire for European recognition.
This discussion between these two men showed the centrality of an issue the
South preferred to avoid, that of the morality of slavery. Rhett blithely dismissed British,
moral concerns, even as Bunch tried to emphasize their importance. The relationship
between cotton and slavery, a relationship especially visible in the American South, was
a sensitive one for Britain. The slave-based economy of the South fueled abolitionist
demands for less reliance on slave-grown cotton. British economist J. T. Danson
commented on the connections between cotton, American slavery and British
manufacturing, stating that ―there is not, and never has been, any considerable source of
supply for cotton, excepting the East Indies, which is not obviously and exclusively
maintained by slave-labour.‖56 Britain had abolished slavery throughout its empire in
1832, which meant that for the British, a nation such as Confederate States of America
that was dependent upon slavery to increase her material wealth was morally inferior (the
British conveniently forgot that Britain had also allowed slavery to flourish in its empire
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in the past). Danson‘s comment captured the feelings of a number of the British
emancipation societies of the time, many of which desired the continuation of the cotton
trade but not the use of slaves to grow and harvest the cash crop.57
In a review of the international relations of the mid-nineteenth century, historian
Robert E. May commented that ―world opinion‖ was not in favor of the continuance of
slavery. 58 Britain was not the only nation to have abolished slavery: by 1861 both
Austria and Imperial Russia had outlawed serfdom, and France and the majority of Latin
American nations had not allowed slavery for decades. 59 Therefore, the fact that the
American South continued to cling to slavery was upsetting to many European nations.
That was one of the problems the new Confederacy faced as it tried to establish
diplomatic ties. Another was trying to organize quickly so as to send ambassadors
abroad. Initially, it relied on informal contacts and meetings such as the one between
Rhett and Bunch, and upon information gathered by friends of the Confederacy. For
example, Seward met with Lord Lyons, British consul to the United States in an
unscheduled visit on March 20, 1861 where he attempted to sound out British reaction to
a possible Union interruption of the southern cotton supply. Seward, pressing Lyons for
information, provoked a blustery response from Lyons, who declared that if the North
interrupted the cotton trade, ―the most simple, if not the only way [to fight back] would
be to recognize the Southern Confederacy.‖ 60 This information was most likely relayed
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to the Confederate leaders. William Howard Russell, a correspondent for the London
Times, traveled throughout the United States, including the South, meeting with future
Confederate Attorney General, Judah P. Benjamin, in Charleston, South Carolina in late
1860. During that meeting Benjamin observed that a British refusal to recognize
Confederate letters of marque would be ―nothing more or less than a declaration of war
against us . . .‖61 Benjamin, confident that Britain was desperate to continue the southern
cotton trade, drew the conclusion from Russell‘s responses that British recognition of the
Confederacy would soon be forthcoming. 62 By the time the Confederacy actually sent
official representatives abroad, most Southerners were convinced that cotton was the key
to a Confederate victory. Southerners had persuaded themselves that British desperation
for southern cotton would bring official recognition, aid, and perhaps even intervention
on the Confederate side.
In their belief that cotton – or the lack thereof – was the key to British support, the
Confederacy chose a tactic that would ultimately backfire – it placed a voluntary
embargo on cotton exports to Europe in 1861. 63 The reasoning behind this decision was
perfectly in line with the Confederate certainty that ―King Cotton‖ diplomacy would
work. The Confederacy reasoned that as cotton supplies dwindled, European nations,
Britain in particular, would suffer economically as workers were laid off and profits fell.
To save their economies, European nations would intervene on behalf of the
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Confederacy. 64 The Confederacy resolved not to lift the embargo until the North ended
its blockade of Confederate ports – implemented in April 1861 – and Confederate
independence was recognized.65
As part of Lieutenant General Winfield Scott‘s Anaconda Plan, Lincoln instituted
a naval blockade of Confederate ports in April 1861 shortly after the attack on Fort
Sumter. The purpose of the blockade was to stop Confederate exports, especially cotton,
thereby destroying the financial basis of the Confederate economy and preventing
Confederate access to outside supplies. 66 The South, along with its belief that the cotton
embargo would bring foreign recognition, also thought that it would preempt the Union‘s
own plans to stop cotton exports and thus destroy the Confederacy financially. This
obviously made sense to the Confederacy, but it did not make financial sense. During the
first year of the Union blockade, the Confederacy could easily have shipped her bumper
crop of cotton abroad due to the spottiness of the blockade itself, thereby earning hard
currency that could have been used to purchase much needed supplies. 67 However, the
South was so convinced that the embargo would work, and that Britain, without Southern
cotton, according to Senator Hammond, ―would topple headlong and carry the whole
civilized world with her,‖ that it failed to understand the damage the embargo would do
to the South.68 In fact, the Confederate belief in the efficacy of King Cotton diplomacy
was absolute. As William Russell observed to his readers, ―King Cotton Diplomacy‖
64
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was ―a lively all-powerful faith without distracting heresies or schisms. They [the
southerners] have in it enunciated their full belief.‖ 69
At first, cotton diplomacy appeared to be working. As cotton shipments ceased,
and in response to government queries, British representatives stationed in the
Confederacy sent word that this move had indeed been voluntary and not forced. One
such message came from Consul Bunch, who wrote Lord Russell in 1861, commenting
that Southerners believed that withholding cotton for one year from Great Britain would
plunge the island nation into social chaos and economic depression. 70 Shortly after the
embargo was instituted and the Union blockade implemented, Queen Victoria of Great
Britain issued a Proclamation of Neutrality that not only declared Britain neutral in the
American Civil War, but also extended to the Confederacy belligerent status. This did not
equate with recognition, but merely gave the Confederacy the legal right to seize ships
and confiscate enemy goods based on the Confederate right of self-preservation. This
proclamation was interpreted by the Confederacy as an example of strong support, but the
Union was horrified, believing that the Proclamation implied that the Confederacy was
indeed a legal entity.71
As the Confederacy became better organized, it began to send diplomats abroad,
and here the Confederacy was at a definite disadvantage when compared to the Union.
The Union‘s representatives possessed more diplomatic expertise and were better known
than their Confederate counterparts. The Confederate representatives were often
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domestically important, but possessed no international experience. The Union‘s
diplomatic hopes rested on its minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., and on a
number of other ministers, among them Henry S. Sanford, the minister to Belgium. On
the other hand, the Confederacy shipped three different groups of diplomats and/or
propagandists overseas during 1861 and 1862 to negotiate with European governments.
The Confederacy first sent three diplomats, William Yancey, Pierre Rost and
Ambrose Dudley Mann, abroad in early 1861. Their mission was to seek official
recognition and negotiate treaties of commerce with all of the major European nations,
but primarily Britain. They were instructed to argue that secession was justified as a
means of self-preservation following the passage of the protective tariff levied by
Congress. Furthermore, the three men were to show that the South had set up an orderly
government and could maintain itself since it controlled much of the eastern and southern
coasts of the United States. These arguments, however, provided no inducement for
Britain or any other nation to support the Confederacy, so the men were instructed to
emphasize that an independent Confederacy could offer virtually free trade to Europe
with almost no tariffs, and this would apply to the cotton that Europe, and especially,
Britain, was dependent upon. The three men met with Lord Russell on May 3, 1861, and
although Lord Russell gave no indication of forthcoming British support, Yancey and
Mann reported to Richmond that they believed that ―recognition would not long be
withheld.72 However, following a subsequent interview on May 9, the three men reported
to Richmond that they now believed that the English government would postpone the
―recognition of the independence of those States . . . as long as possible, at least until
some decided advantage is obtained by them or the necessity for having cotton becomes
72
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pressing.‖73 By September 1861, Yancey appeared to have lost all hope of gaining
British recognition and resigned his post, resulting in the dissolution of the group.
Yancey and Rost were replaced by James Mason and John Slidell.
Despite this diplomatic setback, by the end of 1861, the Confederacy was
convinced that its future was bright. Based on its absolute belief that cotton diplomacy
would work, it sent representatives abroad to negotiate treaties of recognition and
commerce, confident that their mission would be successful. This Confederate
confidence was due to the newly instituted cotton embargo that the South believed would
bring Europe and particularly, Great Britain to its knees and result in widespread
unemployment, profit loss, social unrest, and perhaps even rebellion. As British mills ran
out of cotton, Britain would be forced to grant official recognition to the Confederacy,
provide aid, and perhaps even intervene on behalf of the Confederacy in order to protect
her textile industry and her economy. The Union blockade was dismissed as ineffective
due to the Confederate belief that it had, with its cotton embargo, preempted the
purported purpose of the blockade: to financially destroy the South. Reassured by
informal contacts with the British and by Queen Victoria‘s proclamation, the
Confederacy was convinced that it would not have to wait long for British support.
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Chapter 3: The Union and Confederacy Resort to a War of Propaganda
Propaganda is not a twentieth-century phenomenon, although the word usually
brings to mind images of posters, pictures and phrases from World War II. Although
both the Union and the Confederacy attempted to use propaganda, information gathering
and dissemination, it was especially important for the weaker party, the Confederacy, that
its propaganda efforts were successful in swaying British governmental and public
opinion. The Confederacy desperately sought diplomatic recognition and aid, while the
Union sought only to maintain the status quo.
At the outset of the American Civil War in 1861, the Confederacy relied heavily
on King Cotton Diplomacy, believing that the loss of cotton imports from the American
South would force the European powers, and especially Great Britain, to recognize the
fledgling nation.1 As war erupted, the Confederacy hoped that King Cotton Diplomacy
would be effective and was dismissive of the deep abolitionist feelings within Britain and
the reluctance of the British government to get involved in a war that might have no clear
winner.2
In addition to King Cotton Diplomacy, Confederate President Jefferson Davis
attempted to manipulate foreign nations into supporting the South in a number of other
ways. For example, Davis framed the conflict as one in which the South was asking for
―nothing more than independence,‖ an innocuous argument that could easily win foreign
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recognition.3 Davis also played to British fears of the growing commercial power of the
Union by implying that a Confederate victory would restrain that growth, reducing its
threat to the commercial power of Great Britain. 4 Furthermore, Davis appealed to the
mutual respect and kinship between Southern conservative plantation owners and the
English aristocratic country gentlemen, arguing that such mutual respect ―held out the
promise of far-reaching co-operation and understanding‖ between the two nations. 5
While some, such R. B. Rhett, believed that recognition would lead to British
governmental aid, others hoped for aid from supportive British private parties, such as the
British country gentlemen. 6
Davis might have hoped as Rhett did, for he was certainly aware of the need for
vast amounts of military supplies to equip the new Confederate army, but he chose not to
ask European governments for those supplies when he asked for recognition. Instead the
new president of the Confederacy turned to private firms and connections to find the
necessary equipment. The Confederate government chose the firm of John Fraser & Co.,
with offices in Charleston and subsidiaries in New York (later closed and reopened in
Nassau) and Liverpool, to act as its agent in purchasing supplies from Britain. 7 The
Confederate government deposited its funds with John Fraser & Co. in Charleston, and
3
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the firm issued letters of credit on those funds to the Fraser subsidiary in Liverpool,
which then used those letters of credit to pay for purchases made by Confederate agents
in Britain. 8 In addition, Davis set up the Confederate Ordnance Bureau under the
command of Josiah Gorgas. Gorgas was ordered to equip the proposed 100,000 man
Confederate army. Knowing that the available domestic supplies were inadequate,
Gorgas ordered Captain Caleb Huse to Europe to buy ―whatever was needed and
available,‖ and to arrange for them to be shipped back to the Confederacy. 9 Using letters
of credit made available by the Fraser subsidiary in Liverpool, Huse was successful in
securing the purchase of weapons for the Confederacy, and he remained in England, later
working with James Bulloch and Major Edward Anderson to scour Britain for weapons
to send to the Confederacy. 10 Indeed, Davis was so pleased with Huse‘s success that he
sent instructions to Huse telling him to ―acquire arms as he saw fit, and to act upon his
own responsibility and not be controlled by other government agents.‖11
Compared to the Confederacy, the Union began the war with an existing
intelligence network made up of ambassadors and consuls, such as Charles Francis
Adams, Union ambassador to Great Britain, Henry Shelton Sanford, Union ambassador
to Belgium, and Thomas Haines Dudley, who was both the United States consul in
Liverpool, England, and the man who would become famous for discovering Confederate
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plans to pay for the construction and arming of ships in Britain for Southern use. 12
Dudley worked closely with other Union agents, including Sanford, and the Union consul
in London, Freeman Harlow Morse, to gather intelligence and counter his Confederate
foes.
Adams played a major role in both Union diplomatic and propaganda efforts
during the American Civil War. Traditionally, historians credited diplomats such as
Adams for retaining of British neutrality; however, Adams‘ working relationships with
Henry S. Sanford and Thomas Haines Dudley make claims that Adams operated alone
invalid.13 Adams corresponded with several British civilians including Karl Marx.14
Adams also worked closely with the leaders of the British government, such as Lords
Russell and Palmerston, hoping to convince them to maintain British neutrality. For
example, Adams issued a statement countering claims that Britain had recognized the
Confederacy‘s belligerent status through its issuance of a proclamation of neutrality. 15 In
an interview with Russell on May 18, 1861, Adams protested that the proclamation of
neutrality had been made in haste and showed favor towards the Confederacy ―before
they had ever showed their capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever… It
considered them a marine power before they had ever exhibited a single privateer upon
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the ocean.‖16 Adams worked hard to convince the British government that siding with
the Confederacy was the wrong action to take, and his increasing frustration at Britain‘s
refusal to interfere with Confederate purchases came to a head with the 1862 Alabama
incident, in which he and Dudley failed to prevent Britain from selling and the
Confederacy from launching the ship for use in the war.
Henry Sanford had spent years in Europe, spoke several languages, and had
established a network of contacts, all of which made him eminently suited to work as
both a propagandist and a spy. Although he was officially the United States Minister to
Belgium, he spent most of his time in Great Britain, preferring to gather and disseminate
information for the Union there. He and Morse, both present in London for six months
prior to Dudley‘s arrival, set up a network of detectives to spy on Confederate activities,
and Sanford hired local spies in the hopes of gathering more information. In fact, by the
end of 1861, Sanford was making plans to take over the entire intelligence network
himself, but these plans fell through.
Sanford uncovered evidence of the Confederate shipments arranged by Huse and
others. Sanford often acted as a spy in his official capacity as minister to Belgium, as
evidenced in his dispatches addressed to Seward that November and December,
informing him of Confederate purchases of cloth for military uniforms in Britain. 17
Sanford found out that these purchases were being shipped to New Orleans, then under
Confederate control. 18 The French consul in New Orleans was to receive the shipment,
16
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which would then be sold to the ―rebel authorities.‖19 Earlier that year, Sanford, working
with Morse, hired a police detective, Ignatius Pollaky, to set up a surveillance system to
identify as many Confederate agents as possible. These Union spies were not above
opening mail and tracking the daily movements of the suspects once they identified
them.20 Furthermore, Sanford stationed Union agents at the major ports and steamship
companies to monitor outgoing Confederate war supply shipments, and this eventually
led to the discovery of the Fingal, an incident that will be discussed in Chapter 4.21
Additionally, Sanford was adept at utilizing the European press to keep the
Confederacy from garnering support. Initially, Sanford favored letting Union military
victories speak for themselves, but as the South won an increasing number of victories,
Sanford realized that the Union had to direct its diplomatic and propaganda efforts
towards keeping Britain from recognizing the Confederacy.22 Sanford worked with both
the British and French presses, convincing newspapers to print rebuttals to Confederate
propaganda, and even bought space in some newspapers, such as the Independent Belge,
so that pro-Union articles could be printed.23 He was so certain that these tactics would
work that he wrote to Seward that the Union had ―a pulpit to preach from which reaches a
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large audience & I consider it a very important gain.‖ 24
Despite his accomplishments, other Union agents, such as Charles Francis
Adams, saw Sanford as somewhat of a liability, for they viewed Sanford‘s network as
useful but costly, especially since Adams and Morse, working together, were obtaining
much the same information as Sanford and his network.25 Other Union-affiliated agents,
and even President Lincoln, believed that Sanford‘s quick temper could provoke British
ire and possibly involve the Union in a war that neither side desired, and for which the
Union was almost certainly not prepared. Eventually, a consensus was reached that
Sanford was a liability. 26 As a result, Lincoln and Seward limited the Belgian minister‘s
actions. Lincoln and his government praised Sanford for his ―active and intelligence
services for detecting traitorous proceedings,‖ but ordered him to turn over to Morse his
duties as an intelligence agent and return to his duties as the minister to Belgium. 27
Finally, Seward removed Sanford from the British intelligence network, directing him to
focus his activities on continental Europe, where Sanford still was the Minister to
Belgium, where he remained through the end of the war.
Once the Confederacy had diplomats on the ground in Europe, it turned to another
method of gaining European, and particularly British support – propaganda. From the
war‘s outset, the Confederacy, and, to a smaller extent, the Union, made use of a small
24
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number of native Britons, home-grown agents who usually worked independently of the
Union and Confederate propagandists, both gathering information and disseminating it to
the British population. 28 As Britons, this group of men probably had the most knowledge
concerning actual public sentiment towards the two combatants, and this made them
important assets to the Union and Confederate agents.
However, these home-grown agents were not enough for the Confederacy. Soon
after William Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann had established
themselves in early 1861, a second group was dispatched - the two propagandist agents,
Henry Hotze and Edwin De Leon - who created newspapers and authored pamphlets in
an attempt to reach large numbers of the British people. Hotze was assigned to Great
Britain whereas De Leon‘s post was France. 29
Henry Hotze was perhaps the Confederacy‘s best propagandist in Europe. Hotze
was born in Zurich, Switzerland, on September 2, 1834. Hotze‘s father, Rudolph, was a
captain in the French Royal Service, and his mother was named Sophie Esslinger, but
little else is known about either of them. 30 Likewise, little is known about Hotze‘s youth,
beyond the fact that he received a strong Jesuit education and that he immigrated to
Mobile, Alabama, in 1850 where he became a naturalized citizen on June 27, 1856.31
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Hotze arrived in America with entrenched views about race and the origins of mankind,
views that were intensified when he was asked to translate Essai sur L’inégalité des
Races Humanies by Count Arthur de Gobineau. 32 When Fort Sumter was fired upon and
Davis asked for volunteers, Hotze enlisted in the Mobile Cadets. He served in the
Confederate army for three months, and then reported back to Richmond in late May or
early June 1861 to meet with Leroy Pope Walker, the first Confederate Secretary of
War.33 Hotze was a well-connected young man who persistently sought an officer‘s
commission. In the process, he contacted Colin J. McRae, an acquaintance who later
became the chief financial agent for the Confederacy in Europe and who personally took
Hotze‘s case to Walker and advocated for a diplomatic assignment for the young
soldier. 34 After no initial response, McRae thought that Walker was ignoring his
recommendation and so petitioned Walker again, insisting that Hotze was a man with
talents and skills that would be valuable in service to the Confederacy; hence, Hotze was
discharged from the army and received the assignment that led him to become a
propagandist.35 Hotze‘s task, as stated by Walker, was to communicate with Confederate
agents already in Europe, and work with Huse to try to speed up the private purchase of
war materials. 36
The first challenge for Hotze was to get to Europe. Hotze was unable to leave the
United States through the Union blockade, so he planned to journey to Canada through
32
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Detroit, Michigan, and then travel across the ocean. However, Hotze encountered delays
in Indianapolis and Peru, Indiana, and then saw his plans further frustrated by a derailed
train.37 As a result, Hotze abandoned his original plans and traveled instead through
Buffalo, New York, to get to Canada where, upon his arrival, he was, ―tired, worried, and
all out of patience.‖38 The delays were tiresome but he used them to practice the skills he
would need later. Using his formidable journalistic talents, Hotze, observed and then
reported on the North‘s reactions to the war, such as the Union‘s overconfidence. The
reports were sent back to Richmond, thereby giving the South useful information.39
Finally arriving in Britain on October 4, 1861, Hotze immediately met with his
contacts. Soon he spotted two glaring weaknesses in the Confederacy‘s overseas strategy:
the need for a much stronger Confederate presence in Britain; and the need for the
increased use of propaganda.40 Hotze recognized the hold that the Northern press held
over the British people, and he knew that the Confederacy‘s lack of an organized
diplomatic department and propaganda machine was a severe handicap for the Southern
cause. 41 Hotze believed that Rost, Mann and Yancey were not experienced or
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knowledgeable enough to deal with the political world of Great Britain.42 Furthermore,
while many in the Confederacy sneered at diplomatic and propaganda efforts and were
convinced that military success would yield European recognition, Hotze did not agree,
noting that the Northern propaganda machine already had a head start on information
dissemination, and the Confederacy needed to have a propaganda office in Britain to
counter that.43
Hotze‘s return to Richmond in late October 1861 culminated in his meeting with
Judah Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War. In his report, he observed that the
Confederacy was in desperate need of a full-time British propaganda agent and that he
was an excellent candidate for the position. Benjamin agreed with the younger man‘s
assessment, for he understood that European intervention on behalf of the Confederacy
was absolutely crucial.44 Benjamin, impressed with Hotze‘s insight, arranged a meeting
with Secretary of State Robert M. Hunter, who agreed with Benjamin‘s assessment on the
need for a propaganda machine. As a result, Hunter appointed Hotze a Confederate
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―Commercial Agent‖ to London, granting him the power to accomplish what he had told
Benjamin needed to be done.45
Hotze, now an officially appointed propagandist, was viewed with suspicion by
the British government, whereas diplomats, as officially appointed representatives, were
given at least the chance to be received by foreign governments. Hotze and his Union
counterpart, Thurlow Weed, did have governmental support and were considered
government employees, but they, unlike their diplomatic counterparts, usually did not
follow diplomatic protocol.46 They also were paid less than the official diplomats –
Hotze‘s annual salary was a mere $1,500, a relatively unimportant sum not large enough
to adequately cover his expenses while operating in Britain. 47 John Slidell, who replaced
Pierre Rost as the Confederate envoy to France, and the propagandist assigned to work
with him, Edwin De Leon, both also received salaries that were larger than Hotze‘s. In a
letter dated April 12, 1862, Confederate Secretary Judah Benjamin gave Slidell and De
Leon total credits of $25,000 for ―obtaining the insertion in public journals of Great
Britain and the Continent [of] such articles as may be useful in enlightening public
opinion.‖48 Although no official reason was given for the substantial difference in
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monies between Hotze and the Slidell-De Leon partnership, it could have been due to
Slidell‘s higher position as a diplomat. As the war progressed, the available money
decreased, as did the amount of resources and supplies that could be purchased, further
impeding the propagandists‘ tasks.49
Hotze now began to construct a Confederate propaganda machine from the
ground up, including a network of acquaintances and friends loyal to the Southern cause.
First, Hotze set up The Index, a publication with the task to gain the support of the British
people for the Confederacy by publishing statistics, stories, correspondence, politics, and
news that were favorable to the Confederacy. Hotze quickly realized that one major
obstacle to gaining British support was British society itself, which was stratified and
divided in such a manner that convincing more than one class of British society to
simultaneously support the South was quite difficult.50 In fact, the topic of how class
loyalties affected foreign policy in 1860s Britain has been the subject of much historical
debate, with traditionalists heralding the view that the British aristocracy, the uppermiddle class and political conservatives were sympathetic towards the Confederacy,
while the radicals, the lower-middle class and the working classes were pro-Union. 51 This
division was exacerbated by the fact that the government sometimes gave mixed signals,
such as a statement issued by Lord John Russell in 1862 in which he suggested that the
49
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―great majority [of the British government] are in favour of the South & nearly our whole
people are of opinion that separation wd. be a benefit both to North & South.‖52 On the
other hand, however, other members of the government gave different, and often opposite
signals, such as the Conservative Party‘s leader, Lord Edward George Geoffrey SmithStanley, 14th Earl of Derby, who observed that the first public reaction from the British
public was pro-Union.53 Derby later came under pressure from his numerous political
friends to change his position, which he did, retracting his previous statement and instead
noting that the British public supported the Confederacy. This political game continued
with other government officials such as William Gladstone, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, commenting that Parliament, whose members were divided as much as the
constituents they represented, opposed slavery but remained friendly toward the South.54
These political rivalries were further inflamed by disagreements among the
political statesmen as seen with Lords John Russell and Palmerston. Palmerston, the
British Prime Minister, was rumored to have dominated foreign policy during his reign,
completely overshadowing Russell‘s accomplishments in the government. Lord
Russell‘s appointment to the Foreign Office was made without Palmerston‘s total
support, for he preferred George Herbert Hyde Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon. Deprived
of the position, Clarendon remarked that ―John Russell has neither policy nor principles
of his own, and is in the hands of Palmerston, who is an artful old dodger,‖ clearly a vote
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of no confidence in Russell‘s abilities.55 Other members of the government however,
assumed that Russell‘s appointment was indeed Palmerston‘s doing, for Russell
continued Palmerston‘s so-called ―age of foreign policy, often appearing to be
Palmerston‘s puppet.‖56 However, this does not take into account Lord Russell‘s strongwilled and unpredictable personality or his extensive background in foreign affairs. 57
This knowledge was especially evident during the Trent Affair of 1861 when both he and
Palmerston demanded the release of Confederate commissioners Mason and Slidell. 58
The Conservative Party backed Russell and Palmerston‘s stand during that crisis as a
matter of national interest since the incident was a violation of international maritime
law.59 Despite the fact that Palmerston was Liberal while Russell was Conservative, they
nonetheless formed a partnership that carried over to their work during the American
Civil War, when the issue of intervention was key, and in which the British government
was divided just as much as the other social classes.
As mentioned, the upper-middle and middle classes of British society were
supposedly more likely to support the Union rather than the Confederacy; however,
caution must be taken in making a generalization such as this, for like Britain‘s elite, the
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middle classes were also divided in their loyalties. 60 For example, merchants who sold
supplies to both the Union and Confederacy made more money since the Unionimplemented blockade severely limited the Confederacy‘s access to foreign goods,
making the British ability to market such supplies crucial. The blockade allowed the
Confederacy to claim belligerent status giving it the right to buy arms, equipment and
ships overseas, and for the Confederacy, with its lack of a merchant marine and domestic
manufacturing centers, such imports were crucial. 61 As mentioned earlier, working
through the firm of John Fraser & Company, the Confederacy set about quietly
purchasing desperately needed weapons and supplies from private British firms
On the other hand, mill owners and managers often supported the Union for
several reasons, all economic. First, both the managers and mill owners believed that if
Great Britain decided to enter the American Civil War in support of the Confederacy,
profits would be lost and global markets would be destabilized, both undesirable
economic situations. 62 Britain was making huge profits from the war, especially in
munitions by selling to both sides.63 It was also seeing increasing profits in shipping,
since Confederate cruisers and privateers were making it dangerous to ship goods on
Union ships; therefore, Britain, being a neutral, picked up the slack. 64 Second, some
merchants imported wheat, and demand for wheat rose as the war continued, especially in
60
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light of small British wheat crops in 1860-1862.65 As demand rose, so did prices, and
Britain began importing more wheat from the United States. Some in Britain were
fearful that if Britain supported the Confederacy, British merchants would lose access to
American wheat, creating a food crisis in Britain, and destroying their profits.66
Unwilling to risk damage to their profit margins, many merchants believed that
supporting the Union, not the Confederacy, was the wiser course. However, many
merchants and traders supported the Confederacy because a number of them were
negatively impacted by the blockade. One such group – the ―free traders‖ – owned or
worked for businesses that traded with the Confederacy. The blockade had severely cut
into their profits, and so these merchants were Confederate supporters.67
Traditionalist historians commonly asserted that Union sympathy was rather
prevalent in British society, and especially in the middle and working classes. More
recently, historians such as Mary Ellison and Douglas Lorimer challenged this idea,
citing as evidence the people of Lancashire. Ellison proposed that the British middle
class supported the Confederacy for several reasons: first, support for the Confederacy
seemed to be the quickest way to obtain raw cotton; second, they viewed the
Emancipation Proclamation as somewhat hypocritical, since it still sanctioned slavery in
the border states; third, many felt that a Confederate victory would eventually lead to the
end of southern slavery, since many British believed that slavery was on its way out in
the American South; and finally, many British believed that American southerners had a
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fundamental right to choose their own form of government.68 Ellison also refuted the
notion that the lack of agitation from the Lancashire workers signified support for the
Union, and argued that it cannot be assumed that the workers were sympathetic towards
the North. Ellison argued that many wanted the South to win and gave the Confederacy
their moral backing. Ellison believed that the workers felt only mistrust for the Union, a
feeling that deepened as the war progressed.69
Lorimer sided with Ellison concerning the British public‘s loyalties during the
war, thereby supporting that revisionist interpretation, but he delved more deeply into the
intricacies of British society, particularly the political and social aspects that divided the
populace. 70 For example, like his colleague, Lorimer stated that large segments of the
British populace supported the Confederacy‘s fight for independence while nursing a
strong distrust of northern war aims, and even those workers in Lancashire who were
rumored to have endorsed the Union in reality favored the Southern states, urging the
British government to back the Confederacy. 71 The workers‘ most pressing issue was
more economic than moral, a point identified in traditional historiography. Groups who
shared the Lancashire workers‘ concerns urged the British government to move as
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quickly as possible to help the Confederacy achieve its independence, firmly believing
that if this was done, their economic situation would quickly improve. 72
In fact, a large number of mill workers were paying close attention to the
American conflict. By November 1862, an estimated 330,000 mill workers were
unemployed in Britain. 73 Every morning, crowds gathered in Liverpool waiting for the
mail from the United States to arrive. They hoped for news that there were incoming
cotton shipments, or news that Britain was standing fast on, or conversely, setting aside,
her neutrality. Some feared that if Britain intervened on the side of the Confederacy, the
Union would declare war on Great Britain. A cotton spinner, John Ward from Clitheroe,
commented on January 1, 1862, that the New Year was not beginning on a positive note,
for thousands of mill workers had been laid off and others worried that their jobs would
vanish in the next year, noting that, ―A war with America [would be the final straw] as
we [Britain] will get no cotton.‖74 Now that British surplus cotton supplies were mostly
consumed, finding enough cotton to keep its textile industry running became the British
preoccupation. Despite some small successes in establishing permanent alternate cotton
sources, American cotton was still the most commonly imported cotton variant; however,
by the beginning of 1862, as American cotton shipments became increasingly rare, Surat,
or Indian cotton, although of poorer quality, was being imported more frequently. 75
Furthermore, spinning Surat cotton required fewer workers, which resulted in excess
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numbers of available workers and lower wages for those still employed; however, for the
owners, the money saved from paying less workers actually more than made up for the
decreased profits from sales of the poorer quality products.76
The mills provided little aid or support to their unemployed workers, and as the
supply of raw cotton decreased, the number of unemployed workers increased.77 Since
the blockade was seen as a major factor in the decrease in European cotton supplies, it
was also seen as a factor in the subsequent cotton famine that the Confederacy had hoped
for earlier in the war and that Britain had feared.
Thus, by the end of 1862, one-fifth of the mill workers in Lancashire were on
relief, while in other areas close to 40 percent of the population was being helped by
charitable organizations due to unemployment. 78 In addition, there were millions more
who were on the verge of losing their jobs. Both the Union and the Confederate
propagandists attempted to sway the opinion of these workers, hoping that their
desperation would lead them to throw their support to one side or the other. Hotze used
his Index to appeal to these workers. In the Index, Hotze published letters from shipping
houses in New York and London indicating that private agents were scouring the globe
for available cotton, since the Union blockade prevented any available Confederate
cotton from reaching Britain, a fact that Hotze continually hammered home. 79
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Correspondents related that Southern planters would not send any cotton as long as the
Union occupied port cities, and Hotze cleverly blamed the Union for the fact that the
profit margins of the ―free traders‖ were suffering. 80 Furthermore, Hotze was wellinformed about the falling stockpiles of cotton in Britain, reporting those numbers to the
public whenever possible. In an issue of the Index dated May 1, 1862, Hotze reported:
The stock of American cotton in Liverpool, 1st January, was 279,400 bales, of all
kinds 622,600. Total import since, 320,755. Stock of American, April 25th,
124,250. Total, 398,890 bales. The quantity afloat to arrive from Bombay [India]
is about 170,000 bales, or 50,000 less than at the corresponding period of 1861.
These figures show the total available supply in the port, 1st January, to 25th April,
to have been 953,000 bales.81
Hotze used statistics to convince the British public of the danger of supporting the Union,
using them to heighten British workers‘ fears of unemployment. In this same article,
Hotze also played on fears of social unrest, stating that a cotton famine would be
disastrous for the British textile industry. He argued that the apathy of the British
populace towards intervention on behalf of the Confederacy would dissipate as cotton
stockpiles decreased. 82 Hotze continued to play on fears of unemployment, publishing
statistics on cotton stockpiles in every issue of the Index. Hotze repeatedly emphasized
the negative impact of the Union blockade on the British textile industry. In an issue of
the Index dated October 23, 1862, Hotze commented
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The great depression noted in my last report continued unabated on Thursday and
Friday, the sales each day reached barely a thousand bales, and a further decline of
1/2d. was submitted to in Surats. …In American cotton, scarcely any business has
been done in the last few days. Yesterday no sales whatever were recorded, and today only 100 bales; the price of Middling Orleans may be put nominally at 26d. 83
If Hotze‘s reports did not change minds, they must have reinforced some beliefs already
held by some British workers.
The divisions within the British elite drew Hotze‘s attention. Hotze believed that
the elite were typically divided along more political lines rather than by socioeconomic
conditions. 84 Hotze‘s investigations revealed a number of reasons why the British elite
supported the South, among them a hatred of democracy and a desire to reassert
aristocratic traditions. Britain‘s elite opposed giving political power to the masses. Hotze
was aware of this distaste for democracy, and he knew that in order to influence British
opinion, he would have to work from the top down. This meant starting with the elite,
among whom the Conservatives tended to support the Confederacy, while the Liberals
tended to support the Union and the democracy it represented.85 However, even within
these two divisions, debates raged between those in favor of self-determination,
nationalism or just those (usually government officials) who sympathized the
Confederacy but were unwilling to grant recognition or intervene. There were even some
officials, such as the Second Earl of Granville, George Gower, the Lord President of the
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Queen‘s Council, who in 1862 advocated mediation.86 Granville‘s caution was indicative
of most members of the British Parliament, who waited to see which side was more likely
to win.
In Great Britain, anti-slavery feelings were a major obstacle for Hotze‘s
propaganda machine. Throughout Britain, publications advocated support for both sides;
The Spectator editorialized its opinion on the slavery issue in 1862 by stating that ―all
Englishmen now assume, that absolute subjugation of the South is a dream, that the war
is a question of boundaries, – a question, as mathematicians would say, of the maximum
or minimum extent of the slave power.‖87 Confederate sympathizers were concerned
about the Spectator’s editorial, fearing that Britain‘s stance on slavery would affect her
stand on the war.88 For United States Minister Charles Adams, that fear was very much
evident in mid-1862 when Confederate diplomat James Mason petitioned the British
government to formally recognize the Confederacy, and the fact that the petition was
accepted without comment did nothing to quell Adams‘ fears. Adams warned William
Seward that if the Union was to stand a chance at convincing Britain to remain neutral,
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then the moral argument of the war had to switch from preserving the Union to fighting
against the evils of slavery. 89
Union and Confederate propagandists also found themselves facing British bias
and perceptions of Americans from both the Union and the Confederacy. These biases
were fanned by outspoken British authors such as Sydney Smith and Fanny Trollope,
who looked down upon the United States, declaring that the United States was ―militarily
weak, politically corrupt, and financially unsound.‖90 One such writer, Charles Dickens,
deeply upset Americans with his questions about whether America was a true republic.
Basing his critique on what he experienced during his 1842 American visit, Dickens was
upset by the refusal of the American people outside of abolitionist circles to discuss any
topic related to slave revolts or to freeing slaves. The concept that a topic was taboo just
because a portion of the population was not comfortable discussing it did not fit Dickens‘
idea of a republic. 91 Dickens‘ comments were hurtful to many Americans and may have
worsened relations between the two nations. Dickens‘ public criticism of the American
people complicated an already complex set of beliefs about the American political
situation at the war‘s onset. Another who insulted the Union was Edward Dicey, a
correspondent for The Spectator and Macmillan’s Magazine, who commented that
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Abraham Lincoln was an ill-mannered man, one that ―you would never say… was a
gentleman.‖92
British aristocrats feared that democracy in the United States might inspire British
reformers, such as John Bright and Richard Cobden, to campaign for an enlarged
franchise at home, and the London Times was particularly concerned about the possibility
of domestic reforms.93 Thus, for the propagandists and diplomats alike, the opinions of
British society were a crucial hurdle to overcome. With the attack on Fort Sumter and
the commencement of the war, the British eagerly awaited news of what would happen
next. One British magazine commented that the incident (Fort Sumter) was a
justification of Britain‘s wisdom in choosing a ―solid political system,‖ effectively
undermining the American government and its diplomatic powers.94 However, a lengthy
war was not what the British expected; in fact, the British press had considered a
Southern victory fait accompli, believing that the Union would choose to avoid conflict
and amicably allow the Confederate states to secede. British abolitionists and reformers
like Bright and Cobden had also agreed that a ―quiet secession‖ was the best course for
the Union to take since it would avoid years of bloodshed. However, once the
Confederates attacked Fort Sumter, that war the British believed would never happen,
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was now a reality. In 1861, few members of Parliament seemed to have been openly proConfederate, and, according to Ellison, many of the working classes were actually proConfederate.95 According to historian Howard Jones, by mid-1861 it seemed as if some
members of the British government might be moving toward a decision concerning their
stance in the American Civil War. This was evident when Parliamentary member
William H. Gregory announced his intention to present a motion for British recognition
of the Confederacy, stating that both the war and the Morrill Tariff had convinced him
that Britain had to pull back into her own orbit, putting her interests (particularly
economic) first. Gregory believed that if Britain supported the Confederacy in the
conflict and the Confederacy won its independence, Britain would be in a better position
to negotiate with the new nation for trade and economic benefits. However, Gregory
received little support for his motion, and the official policy of British neutrality
continued. 96 Fellow Parliamentary member William E. Forster responded to the failure
of Gregory‘s motion with one of his own, stating that Britain would remain neutral in the
war not only because it was the wisest political move at the time, but also because Britain
had no wish to resume the African slave trade, an indication of Britain‘s abolitionist
beliefs. 97
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Adams saw how Parliamentary debate affected the government, but also how
divided the politicians were over what action to take. The Confederate position was one
of underdog and victim, but many politicians also believed it was Britain‘s humanitarian
duty to end the bloodshed. To counter that, Adams urged Seward to emphasize the
Union‘s moral stance in the war.98 Adams knew that Mason‘s petition was controversial,
and his thoughts were confirmed when Lord John Russell mentioned to Lord Richard
Lyons, the British representative in Washington that the ensuing debate had surprised
him. In fact, Lord Russell had been astonished by the amount of passion present in
Parliament in 1862, as the issue of intervention once again became a topic of interest.
Lord Russell concluded that, ―The great majority are in favour of the South.‖99 Lord
Russell‘s affirmation of the large amount of Confederate support in the British
Parliament, when coupled with Lord Russell‘s personal views, further alarmed Adams.
However, although Lord Russell admitted to favoring the restoration of the Union, he
also stated that he was not sure of the war‘s outcome. 100 In order to maintain a neutral
stance, Lord Russell indicated that he would take the middle ground between the two
American factions. That infuriated Seward, for it meant that Britain‘s decision for or
against neutrality might be based on the direction of the conflict itself. 101 In 1862 the war
was running in favor of the Confederacy, which had achieved major victories at the
Second Battle of Bull Run and the Battle of Fredericksburg, and so this comment by Lord
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Russell seemed to clearly imply that Britain would soon officially recognize the South
and provide aid and possibly intervention. 102
Despite the Confederate victory at Fredericksburg, in December 1862,
Confederate support in Britain began to decline due to a shift in the purpose of the Civil
War. Until the Battle of Antietam in September 1862, the North‘s purpose for fighting
the war was to preserve the Union. However, Lincoln, seizing upon the more or less
victorious outcome of Antietam, issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on
September 22, 1862, that freed the slaves in those areas in rebellion and that would
become effective on January 1, 1863. Now there was a new moral purpose behind the
Union cause – the abolition of slavery, and this cause resonated with the British who had
abolished slavery throughout the empire.
Now Hotze and his fellow propagandists redoubled their efforts to gain British
support. As early as 1862, Hotze published correspondence from a New Yorker who
agreed with a brochure written by Edwin De Leon, the Confederate propagandist in
France. In this brochure, titled La Vérité sur les États Confederès d’Amérique, De Leon
offered several arguments supporting the continuation of slavery. Hotze utilized this
correspondence as propaganda to show the British public that slavery was not a cruel
institution, but instead one that protected happy, contented Negroes. Hotze continued to
use De Leon‘s brochure as evidence that the institution of slavery in the Confederacy was
a blessing for African Americans, not a curse.103 One popular quotation used in various
media for propaganda purposes came from De Leon‘s brochure: “Le noir… preférera
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l’état des choses auxquelles il a été habitué, ce qui lui a permis d’atteindre un âge… de
la tranquillité et des jouissances matérielles,” which represented a common Southern
argument that the blacks were perfectly content with their lives. 104 To this argument, De
Leon added that the character of the Confederacy‘s ―peculiar institution‖ allowed the
Southern states to send all of its white males off to war without damaging her agrarian
economy because there were thousands of black workers, still available to farm and run
the plantations.105 De Leon and Hotze were both aware of the negative reputation of
slavery in Europe, particularly in Britain and France, and so De Leon attempted to
downplay that by using the phrase ―peculiar institution‖ to build a more positive image of
slavery. 106
Hotze‘s Index continued to report on the American conflict as well as events in
Europe, adding increased calls for the British to recognize that slavery was not evil or
immoral. Hotze had long supported the idea of the inferiority of non-white races.
Beginning with his translation of Gobineau‘s Essai, Hotze had been an early convert to
the idea of racial anthropology as the underlying factor of racial inequality. 107 In various
writings, Hotze implied that blacks were meant to be the servants of the white race, since
he said that they were made by God to be intellectually inferior. However, although he
made many statements about racial inequality and the virtues of southern slavery, it was
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not until 1864, in an article titled, ―Abolitionism and the Negro,‖ that Hotze stated in
clear, precise terms his opinion: ―[Negroes are] intellectually inferior to white people…
[but] are nevertheless men—men who, as the institution of negro slavery in the South
shows… are capable of social progress… are happy, and who above all else have
aspirations for immortality.‖ 108
Hotze also attempted to interpret historical facts to his advantage. In the same
article, Hotze argued that the profits from the slave trade had actually helped the Union
become great; specifically, he mused that ―[the slave trade] raised New York to the rank
of an Empire city, and lined her streets with marble palaces… [and] the profits realised
from dealing in the products of negro labour… laid the foundation of the greatness of
Boston.‖109 With this comment, Hotze attacked the validity of the Union‘s claims that
slave labor was less productive than free labor, because enslaved blacks had directly
contributed to the growth of wealthy urban centers such as Boston and New York. Hotze
continued his propagandist tactics by stating that slavery was not the catalyst behind the
dissolution of the United States or a moral evil; it was simply a way of life that had
helped both the North and the South become successful. 110
Union propagandists and agents were also active in Britain during the early years
of the war. Like their Confederate counterparts, the Union commissioners were sent to
Europe with the goal of gaining British support for the war – specifically, to keep Britain
from recognizing and aiding the Confederacy by persuading it to remain neutral.
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Secretary of State William Seward was concerned that foreign governments might view
the South‘s actions as justifiable. The South‘s persistence in framing the conflict in terms
of Confederate independence was designed to appeal to those with more liberal
convictions, and the Union was determined to convince Europe, and particularly Britain,
that the conflict was not a justifiable fight for Confederate independence but instead an
illegal attempt to destroy the Union. 111 Seward ignored warnings from his own consuls
and diplomats such as Henry Sanford that he was not taking advantage of the collective
goodwill and sympathy available to the Union during the early stages of the conflict,
spurning such sympathy as worthless. Seward even commented in a letter to John
Bigelow, the new American consul in Paris, that ―foreign sympathy… never did and
never can create or maintain any state.‖112
However, Seward‘s attitude drastically changed upon receiving confirmation that
the Confederacy had decided to send another group of emissaries to Europe: former
United States Senators James Mason and John Slidell. Their assignment led to two
crises: one external and the other internal. The first was the Trent Affair, an incident that
involved Mason and Slidell being taken into custody in international waters on a ship
registered to Great Britain. This incident created a diplomatic crisis that the Confederacy
hoped to use to garner British support. Furthermore, Seward and President Lincoln were
concerned about the Confederacy‘s proactive approach in sending additional emissaries
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abroad. This led Seward to hastily assemble a team of commissioners to travel to Europe
to intercede on behalf of the Union and counteract the Mason-Slidell mission.113
Thurlow Weed, both a close friend to Seward and his campaign manager during
the 1860 election, was particularly interested in this hand-picked commission. 114 Seward
chose four men as Union commissioners: Edward Everett, John P. Kennedy, John
Hughes and Charles McIlvaine. However, only McIlvaine and Hughes accepted.115
Everett, a former United States Secretary of State and a Senator from Massachusetts,
refused to take on an unofficial position overseas when he had previously been the
American ambassador to Great Britain, and Kennedy did not want to leave his business
without the chance of compensation.116 Seward was embarrassed when Everett and
Kennedy turned down the mission. The remaining candidates also had doubts concerning
their appointments, but it was in John Hughes, the Catholic Archbishop of New York,
that Weed took a peculiar interest, relating in his memoirs their conversation at a dinner
party hosted by Seward. Hughes told Weed at that dinner that he had declined Seward‘s
offer; luckily for him, the former campaign manager Weed had a solution to the
problem. 117
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The ever-persistent Weed took up Seward‘s cause, stressing that it was
Archbishop Hughes‘s obligation as a ―loyal citizen, devoted to the Union, and capable of
rendering great service‖ to accept Seward‘s offer, and he used Hughes‘ Irish birth as an
additional reason why Archbishop Hughes should accept Seward‘s offer. Weed‘s
persistence paid off: Archbishop Hughes agreed to take Seward up on his offer, with the
condition that Weed must accompany him overseas. 118 Weed reluctantly agreed,
commenting that he could not think of a reason to turn Weed down. 119
Seward finally had his representatives. The final list included: General Winfield
Scott, a Mexican-American war hero and author of the Anaconda plan that included a
Union blockade of the Confederacy; Archbishop Hughes, who would ultimately battle
with Confederate John Slidell for France‘s sympathy; McIlvaine, who would woo and
gain the Anglican clergy‘s support; and Weed, whose past as Seward‘s wily campaign
manager made him an ideal match for James Mason.120
Not everyone approved of Seward‘s choices. William Russell, reporter for the
London Times, commented that while Weed‘s skills as a political lobbyist were
admirable, they did not necessarily make him a good match for Mason. Russell wrote to
a fellow war correspondent in New York that while Weed‘s slyness was an admirable
trait, ―he will be of small weight among the polished politicians of France or England.‖ 121
Another who disapproved of Seward‘s choices was Charles Francis Adams, who
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commented that Hughes, McIlvaine and Weed seemed ―to [be to] me of no value.‖ 122
Weed in turn, rebutted Adams, commenting upon his arrival at the United States Legation
in London that he should have arrived earlier, for he viewed Adams‘ alarmed state and
paranoia as making it more difficult than it already was to effectively gain public
support.123
In terms of propaganda, Hotze mentioned in a letter dated September 1862, to
Judah Benjamin, that he believed himself capable of overcoming the Union‘s own
propaganda machine. 124 That may have been the case, but effectiveness rested not just on
people, but also on process. While both Union and Confederate agents gathered
information, they disseminated it somewhat differently. The Union‘s diplomatic base in
Britain was much stronger than the Confederacy‘s, but the Union did not have a
mouthpiece on the level of The Index. Union diplomats, however, regularly used
established media forms such as newspapers to woo the British public. But often the
American representatives themselves were left out of the propaganda loop. For example,
the backlash from the Trent Affair ensured that the Union diplomatic representative,
Charles Francis Adams, was not only furious, but humiliated that his overall knowledge
of the affair was no better than what the general public gleaned from The Times.125 This
situation, when coupled with Adams‘ failure to procure valuable information, contributed
to the difficult task of gaining public support for the Union. Benjamin Moran, the
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Assistant Secretary at the United States Legation in London, commented on the difficulty
of gaining British support when he chanced to look out a window and saw that the
American owners of the Adelphi Theatre had added the Confederate flag alongside the
Union‘s Stars and Stripes. This action was a symbol of the split in sympathies among
both American residents and native Britons, but it could also have been a wise business
decision designed to attract clientele from both sides. 126
If sympathies in London were divided, they were also divided in other major
British towns; for example, in Liverpool, where the new Union consul, Thomas Haines
Dudley, began laying the groundwork for his intelligence network. Dudley‘s arrival in
Liverpool coincided with the Trent Affair, and his duties were threefold: building an
intelligence network; continuing his official business as a consul; and engaging in a
propaganda war with the Confederacy. 127 Moran, upon meeting Dudley, remarked that
―he is as intelligent as he looks and talks with great force…. I was much gratified to find
him a strenuous patriot. He is modest, refined and able and would make a splendid
European representative.‖128 Moran‘s approval matched that of Adams, for he regarded
the Liverpool consul as a peer equipped to handle the tenuous situation in Europe.
Dudley proved his worth early in the game for he soon reported to Adams and Moran that
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Southern expatriates in Liverpool were capitalizing on the Trent Affair in an attempt to
gain support for the Confederacy. 129
Upon arriving in London, Dudley was invited to a banquet in honor of John
Bright, a radical Member of Parliament who was an antislavery activist and with a strong
record of friendship with the Union. This was the beginning of a firm relationship
between the two men. Bright remarked, in a letter written to Dudley on December 9,
1861, that ―there are two nations in England, the governing class and the millions who
toil, the former dislike your Republic and their organs incessantly misrepresent and
slander it,‖ correctly implying that British society was not unified in its opinion on the
American conflict; rather, the existing divisions prevented unanimity concerning what
actions the British government should take.130
Adams and Dudley dealt daily with assertions that the anti-Union hostility already
present in British society was expanding and could influence the government. This fear
motivated Union efforts to sway public sentiment towards support for British neutrality.
Both men knew that Union efforts needed to be intensified after word spread in 1862
about General Benjamin Butler‘s disastrous General Order No. 28 concerning the
treatment of certain women in captured New Orleans. Butler‘s threat to treat those
women who insulted his troops as prostitutes outraged and simultaneously offended the
British elite who termed the law ―barbaric and outrageous.‖131 Prime Minister Lord
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Palmerston publicly denounced Butler‘s actions in a speech to the House of Commons in
June 1862, in which he expressed his disappointment and disgust.132
Palmerston‘s ministry, much like the British public, was split on the issue of
intervention. Hotze‘s preliminary observations revealed that among those supporting the
Union were a handful of extremely powerful men such as Lord John Russell in the House
of Lords; however, in the House of Commons there was not strong support, and in both
houses, there was little action on matters involving aid to the Confederacy. 133 One
powerful member who supported the Confederate cause, William S. Lindsay, remarked
that he hoped the Civil War would be the end of American greatness, while Union
supporter William Forster argued that British neutrality benefitted the Union. 134 Because
the government was precariously balanced, the Prime Minister knew that one wrong
move on his part could bring down the fragile coalition and force new elections that had
the potential to destabilize the government at a time when global and domestic conflicts
were of great concern. 135 This view was expressed in a public address printed in the
London Gazette: ―Her Majesty… has seen no reason to depart from the neutrality to
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which she has steadily adhered.‖ 136 This and other government-sponsored messages
made the propagandists‘ job more difficult. Therefore, Hotze worked closely with
Confederate Commissioner James Mason to try to convince the British government to
support the Confederacy. Both used intelligence gathered from the British populace to
pressure the British government.137 Adams and Dudley also gathered intelligence to
counter Confederate publications and, in Adams‘ case, to try to convince Lords Russell
and Palmerston to support British neutrality. 138 It is interesting to note that throughout
the war the British press continually emphasized Britain‘s positive stance on neutrality so
as to not upset any one segment of the population or government.139
As the war continued, the Confederacy grew increasingly concerned that the
British government stubbornly remained neutral, a choice that implied support for the
Union. With the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, the worst fears of the
Confederacy were realized – the war was now viewed in Britain as a moral conflict over
slavery – and the Union was in a stronger position to pressure the British to remain
neutral. Hotze worked against abolitionist sentiments to sway public opinion in favor of
the Confederacy, at one point writing to M. T. Hunter that the ―vast majority of the
British public . . . are now anxious to do something to strengthen us. . .‖140 Despite this
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optimism, due to the divisions within British society concerning neutrality, Hotze‘s
attempts to convince people to support the Confederacy were generally unsuccessful.
Even though Hotze, in correspondence with Benjamin, at times exaggerated his success
in changing public opinion, the fact remained that since the issuance of Lincoln‘s
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in 1862, there had been a shift in public opinion
concerning the South.141 As Hotze attempted to downplay the issue of slavery, Thurlow
Weed countered Hotze‘s actions in his meetings with high officials in both the British
and French governments, by playing up the Union‘s strengths and the strong economic
partnership that had existed between the United States and Britain since before the
American Revolution.142
In comparing the propaganda efforts of Union and Confederate representatives, a
few key differences appear. One was that the Confederate propaganda machine was
aimed at the general population of Britain – particularly after the creation of The Index –
whereas the Union seemed to focus more on the British government, working from the
top down. This did not mean, however, that the Confederacy neglected government
officials, for as already mentioned, Hotze was particularly adamant about appealing to
them based on touted similarities between Southern planters and the British elite. 143 In a
December 27, 1861, letter to Seward, Weed related how, during the Trent affair, he had
commenced his own attack on the European public: ―we [the Union] have access to
several journals, for which we have one very able writer, Torrens McCulloch, and two
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subordinates.‖144 In a move echoing what Hotze had done prior to receiving Judah
Benjamin‘s permission to create The Index, Weed convinced a handful of writers to
publish articles in favor of the Union in their own journals. Compared to Hotze‘s
strategies, this was more of a ―sharpshooter‖ tactic, using carefully selected journals and
papers to spread pro-Union propaganda rather than a more widespread use of the media
to appeal to various segments of the population. The effectiveness of propaganda in
swaying British opinion, particularly when the issue of the construction of Confederate
ships in British shipyards appeared, will be investigated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: 1862: The Apex of Confederate Efforts in Britain
Throughout 1862 the Confederate need for British support moved beyond the use
of propaganda machines such as The Index to sway British popular opinion to pressure
politicians. The Confederacy, which had been secretly purchasing supplies and weapons
from British firms, became bolder as it commissioned the construction of ships in British
shipyards. Incensed, the Union found itself not only countering the Confederate
propaganda machines, but also trying to prevent the growing sale of arms and supplies to
Confederacy. Both sides redoubled their diplomatic and propaganda efforts – which
included disinformation and deceit – aimed at the British government and people.
As already mentioned, Hotze‘s use of The Index to publish anti-Union articles had
some success among the working classes, but not so much among the elite. While there
were some high officials who supported the Confederacy, the majority seemed content to
remain neutral, unwilling to commit themselves to the support of a combatant that might
not be victorious. Despite the increasingly severe shortage of raw cotton, the moral issue
of slavery seemed to play a larger role in this determination to remain neutral, and the
fact that British firms and merchants were making huge profits selling supplies to both
sides reinforced the benefits of neutrality.
By October 1862, the British government was basically determined to remain
neutral, and Hotze realized that his Index was not doing enough to influence British
decision makers, and he began working closely with Confederate diplomat James Mason
to convince the British government to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy. Hotze and
Mason, however, continued to reach out to the British people through The Index, as well
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as through existing British media such as newspapers. 1 In addition to his use of the
media, Hotze began assisting British-born Confederate sympathizers in organizing public
rallies and gatherings to gain public support. Hotze knew that having a base of native
support was crucial, because British Members of Parliament had to listen to their
constituents if they wished to be re-elected.2 In this way, Hotze hoped to pressure the
members of Parliament who had thus far resisted his attempts to change their minds.
Therefore, Hotze set aside one thousand pounds to fund public rallies in the areas
hardest-hit by economic difficulties, usually areas with a large unemployed population, in
hopes that their voices would pressure the British government.3 Hotze hoped the rallies
would aid him in spreading propaganda and influencing government officials, but they
apparently resulted in no major gains for the Confederacy.4
Hotze increasingly aimed his propaganda toward the elite and the top members of
the British government, and his efforts were rewarded when he found an ally in William
Lindsay. Lindsay was a Member of Parliament and was intimately acquainted with
Prime Minister Palmerston, Foreign Secretary Russell and most, if not all, of the other
high government leaders. Now, Hotze had an inside source for valuable information. 5
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Lindsay was eager to help the South win, for he was a self-made shipping magnate and
foresaw future profits in a Confederate victory; however, he did not support the retention
of the institution of slavery. 6 Lindsay seized any available opportunity to ensure
Southern success, going so far as to gain an audience with Emperor Napoleon III of
France in 1862 to urge French intervention on the side of the Confederacy. Writing to
Mason after his interview, he said, ―I now have positive and authentic evidence that
France only waits the assent of England for recognition [of the South] and other more
cogent measures.‖7 Hotze and other Confederate supporters were elated by Lindsay‘s
news and hoped that British recognition of the Confederacy was imminent.
Hotze‘s network of collaborators continued to expand when Lindsay and nativeborn James Spence began working together. Spence was a Liverpool merchant who
became a financial agent for Richmond and lecturer for various pro-Confederate
organizations, and he aided Hotze by setting up public meetings and rallies in which he
tackled the question of slavery. 8 Spence argued at length in his book, The American
Union (1861), for the independence of the American South. Spence stated that the Union
was not fighting for the abolition of slavery, and that an independent South would be
forced to improve the lives of its slaves. 9 In this book, Spence advocated a gradual
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abolition of slavery in the Confederacy, and argued that such an action would naturally
occur following the end of the war, for slavery was an ―outdated system of labour neither
morally nor economically viable in the civilized nineteenth century.‖ 10 The Saturday
Review, in a positive review of Spence‘s work, predicted that he would be quite
successful, in part because he did not antagonize abolitionist sentiments and dealt with
the subject of slavery in a logical manner, and he did not advocate social unrest. 11
Hotze‘s The Index pounced on Spence‘s work and reported on it in the June 5,
1862, issue, remarking that Spence‘s research on the ―causes of the dissolution of the
American Union, with such a profound knowledge of the true character of the American
Constitution and laws‖ was so well done that it was hard to understand why the British
government still hesitated to recognize the Confederacy. 12 Hotze‘s praise for his fellow
propagandist did not stop there, for he later reported on a meeting of the Southern Club,
held in Liverpool on October 9, 1862, where Spence presided.13 Organizations such as
the Southern Club adopted Spence‘s views that British recognition of an independent
Confederacy would be the best support possible for the Southern states, and might
encourage gradual and responsible emancipation of slaves. Hotze continued to tread
10
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lightly on the issue of slavery, recognizing its volatility among the British populace. He
indicated to his readers, however, that the Confederacy was more than willing to listen to
the abolitionist promptings of its friends, a message that he hoped would reassure enough
Britons so that no segment of the British public would feel alienated. 14
Many of the same approaches used by Hotze were also used by the Union to
gather information and disseminate propaganda. The Union especially relied on word-ofmouth for intelligence gathering when its agents attempted to gather information on
Confederate shipbuilding as well as their purchase of other arms, munitions and supplies.
Although concerned about the Confederate purchases, Northern agents were confident
that growing British support for neutrality made the possibility of intervention unlikely. 15
The Union believed that it had the ear of the British government, an opinion clearly held
by Thurlow Weed when he related how, upon his arrival in Britain, he broke
through all the usual forms of diplomacy… [and] I was tendered an audience by
Earl Russell… and subsequently was received by the Duke of Argyll, Milnor,
Gibson, Count de Morny, and other distinguished officials in London and Paris,
as a representative of my country, without ever having an opportunity… of
presenting my letters of instruction.16
In this diary entry Weed seemed arrogant and satisfied. Furthermore, he noted that he
was able to meet with Earl Russell and a number of high-ranking British officials without
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having to go through official channels as Adams and Mason had done. 17 Nonetheless,
Union agents watched Hotze‘s reports closely, knowing that the Confederate promoters
and the anti-Union propaganda were having some impact on British opinion.18
Furthermore, about the same time as Weed‘s arrival in Europe, the Union agent and spy,
William M. Walker, U.S.N. reported to his chief, William Seward, on October 20, 1861,
that there was a swarm of ―southern gentlemen,‖ who had entrée to British and French
society and ―were rapidly bringing the upper classes and the educated under their
influence.‖19 Furthermore, some of these ―gentlemen‖ were making purchases and
shipments while using the press to spread their ―views and opinions‖ in the different
circles in which they moved.20 Walker urged that some northern ―gentlemen‖ with good
manners should be sent over immediately to counteract the ―southern gentlemen.‖ 21 The
Union apparently ignored this suggestion, for no ―northern gentlemen‖ ever arrived.
Freeman Harlow Morse, the American consul to London, took over Sanford‘s
network once Sanford was sent back to Belgium in late 1861, and he hired British
detectives to gather information, hoping that the daily reports he received would include a
key piece of intelligence that he could utilize to sabotage Confederate efforts in Europe. 22
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Morse also bribed postal workers to obtain the addresses of Confederate agents, giving
him the opportunity to intercept pieces of mail and telegrams. 23 Morse, like his
predecessor Sanford, successfully obtained crucial information on the shipments of goods
to the Confederacy, playing the role of spy rather than propagandist.24 In a dispatch to
Seward dated November 28, 1862, Morse confirmed that the Confederacy was indeed
shipping supplies to rebel ports under the British flag and had plans to carry on trade
through the ports of Texas and Matamoras, Mexico.25 Morse‘s usage of his intelligence
network was the work of a spy, and his attempts to halt the Confederate supply ships
were tactics intended to produce long-term suffering and put pressure on the Southern
states.26
The Union was especially concerned about Confederate attempts to purchase or
build ships for the Confederate navy, and that concern skyrocketed when Confederate
James Dunwoody Bulloch arrived in Liverpool on June 4, 1861.27 The Confederacy was
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not equipped with a large number of naval yards, and she needed ships. Therefore, in
order to create a navy, the Confederacy negotiated contracts with a number of European
shipyards for the construction of powerful naval vessels. 28 On May 9, 1861, Confederate
Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory ordered Bulloch to travel to Great Britain and
purchase ships capable of preying on Union trade vessels and possibly breaking the
blockade. 29 Bulloch was given one million dollars and allocated more credit to purchase
two ironclad ships in Europe. Bulloch arrived in London with orders from Mallory to
purchase ―six armed steam cruisers, equally capable of destroying United States
commercial shipping on the high seas and engaging blockade ships along the Southern
coast.‖30 Bulloch arrived in Britain seeking to purchase or construct six armed steam
cruisers, as well as arrange for the construction of ironclad ships. 31
Union agents Sanford, Morse, and Ambassador Adams were quite concerned over
Bulloch‘s presence in Europe, with Adams labeling him as ―the most dangerous man the
South can have here and fully up to his business…. So dangerous do I consider this man
that I feel disposed when he comes to the continent, to have him arrested on some charge
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or other.‖32 Even though Sanford was not active in Britain after 1861, he, too, knew the
danger that Bulloch posed to the Union. In a preemptive strike, Sanford bought all the
weapons and saltpeter he could in continental Europe to prevent Southern sympathizers
from purchasing them for the secessionist cause. 33
Bulloch, in turn, was cautious in searching for willing shipbuilders, particularly
because of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. This act forbade the ―equipping,
furnishing, fitting out, or arming‖ in British territory of any naval vessel with the intent of
using it against a belligerent nation; Confederate plans to use the ships against the Union
clearly violated this law.34 Bulloch‘s Liverpool solicitor, however, interpreted the act as
not prohibiting the construction of any ship, but merely forbidding the arming of a ship
inside Britain‘s dominion with the intent to use it against a friendly state. 35 Though not a
propagandist himself, Bulloch‘s use of the loophole showed his willingness to misinform
his enemies about his actions. In this case, Bulloch used disinformation and deceit to
hide his actions from Union agents, which included funding the ships‘ construction under
false identities and having the shipyards begin building them.
Bulloch‘s first acquisitions were raiders and blockade runners. Shortly before
Bulloch‘s arrival in Britain, a former U.S. Navy officer, Raphael Semmes, acting on
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behalf of the Confederacy, had purchased and converted a steam packet called the
Havana into a fighting ship ―armed with a massive 8-inch pivot gun and four 32pounders.‖36 On the Havanna, renamed the Sumter, Semmes prepared to go to sea and
begin his campaign against the Union, but several Federal warships arrived to prevent the
Sumter‘s departure. Semmes managed to escape from the small Federal fleet, including
the fifth largest warship in the Union Navy, the Brooklyn, by utilizing the small size of
the Sumter to his advantage.37 The Sumter escaped a Federal patrol once again in
Martinique and went on to capture a total of eighteen Union ships, burning three of them.
The Union knew that although it was small, the Sumter’s presence did more harm than
just the physical capture of ships, for it caused a number of Union ships to remain in port,
leave on smaller and less profitable voyages, or sometimes fly foreign flags in an attempt
to elude that ship and other Confederate vessels. 38
Soon after his arrival in Britain, Bulloch purchased a private ship, the Fingal, a
propeller-driven vessel of relatively new construction that, while on a test run, clocked in
at thirteen knots under steam, a speed high enough that Bulloch thought it had potential to
become a blockade-runner.39 Taking possession of the vessel in Greenock, Scotland,
Bulloch noted that ―it was necessary to act with caution and secrecy, because the
impression got abroad that the Confederate Government was trying to fit out ships in
36
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England to cruise against American commerce and… all vessels were closely watched.‖ 40
Nonetheless, Bulloch procured the Fingal, had her loaded with critical military and naval
supplies destined for the Confederacy. 41 Bulloch obtained legal documentation from the
Board of Trade stating that the ship was free to depart for either Bermuda or Nassau, with
a small crew of sailors and engineers. No mention was made of the ship‘s cargo. 42
However, Henry Sanford‘s intelligence network discovered that the Fingal was set to
depart from Greenock with munitions for the Confederacy. 43 One of Pollaky‘s men
discovered that the Fingal was soon to set sail and reported:
after cruising unmolested amongst ‗an immense assortment of multifarious
goods‘—I fortunately observed the cases [.] there is no mistake about them as in
addition to the marks… they also have a card on each Isaac Campbell & Co. they
are remaining on the platform ready for delivery, depend upon it I will keep a
bright look out on them. 44
Brennan, one of Pollaky‘s men, reported the hourly movements surrounding the Fingal to
Pollaky, who in turn gave the reports to Sanford, but the observations failed to make any
mention of Bulloch or his crew actually boarding the ship.45 Bulloch, fearful of detection
and detention by British customs, and knowing that his movements were being closely
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watched, moved up the time of the Fingal‘s departure.46 Meanwhile, Bulloch slipped
down the coast and boarded the Fingal at a different harbor, accomplishing an escape.47
When Bulloch and the Fingal arrived safely in Bermuda, he received a dispatch
from Stephen Mallory, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy. Mallory congratulated
Bulloch on his acquisition of the Fingal, approved the contracts for the building of two
warships that would become the Florida and Alabama, and approved Bulloch‘s plan to
captain the Fingal through the Union blockade and back to the Confederacy with her
supplies.48 Bulloch eluded the Union blockade and sailed the Fingal up the Savannah
River, where the Union‘s larger ships were unable to follow. The Confederacy got its
supplies, but the Federal blockade prevented the Fingal from resuming her service as a
supply transport or raider. She was later converted into an ironclad and renamed the
Atlanta, but was captured by Federal troops in June, 1863.49
While the Sumter and the Fingal were helpful, it was clear a tougher ship was
needed: a warship. Earlier, after his arrival in Liverpool, Bulloch began to quietly search
for a naval yard amenable to the Confederacy. By August 1861, Bulloch had £131,000 to
begin purchasing or subsidizing the construction of Confederate ships; soon he had
contracts for the construction of two vessels: the Oreto and ship 290.50
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The first true warship constructed for the Confederacy was the Oreto, later
rechristened the Florida, built at the William C. Miller and Sons shipyard in Liverpool. 51
Adams found out about the Oreto‘s construction and sent Dudley to investigate further.
Dudley uncovered Bulloch‘s secret shipbuilding program in the early months of 1862,
discovering that the ships were funded by the British firm Fraser, Trenholm and
Company, the same firm that bankrolled the majority of Confederate purchases
throughout the war.52 On February 3, 1862, Dudley reported to the Union‘s State
Department what he had uncovered concerning the Oreto:
The builders [at the Liverpool shipyard] say she is intended for the Italian
Government. Fawcett Preston & Co. are fitting her out, supplying all the
machinery, etc. From this fact and some other suspicious circumstances I am
afraid she is intended for the South. She has one funnel, three masts, bark rigged,
eight port holes on each side and is to carry sixteen guns. Her coal is now being
put on board and she will go to sea most likely the latter part of the week. Her
armament is not as yet on board and the appearances indicate that she is to leave
Liverpool and receive (armaments) at some other place. 53
Dudley contacted the Italian Embassy, where the Italian professed ignorance that
his government had funded the construction of a ship; Charles Francis Adams saw this as
additional confirmation that the Confederacy was attempting to slip ships out of Britain
for use against the Union.54 Construction on the Oreto was finished in February 1862, so
Dudley and Adams launched an immediate campaign to stop the ship from sailing. The
two men discovered evidence of arms shipments sent from Liverpool to islands along the
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West African coast, where they were then shipped to the Confederacy – one way of
working around the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. 55 They presented this
evidence to the British government, to no avail. One of Dudley‘s major successes
concerning the Oreto incident was the discovery that Bulloch was the Confederate agent
in charge of obtaining ships. When Dudley destroyed his cover, Bulloch became
emboldened, as when he commanded the Oreto when she was launched (although, he
then turned control over to Captain James Duguid).56 Bulloch spoke of Dudley in his
memoirs as being in a ―wakeful and agitated condition during the remainder of the war‖
once he discovered the Confederate successes in circumventing the British Foreign
Enlistment Act.57
Adams turned over the information that he and Dudley had gathered on the Oreto
to the Foreign Office in March 1862, which in turn sent customs officers to inspect the
ship. The lack of arms on the ship led the officials to conclude that the Oreto was not a
warship; therefore, there was no cause for denying her launch.58 Infuriated by the news,
both Adams and Dudley attempted to take their information and pleas to Lord Russell,
but the foreign secretary had left London, and this allowed Bulloch to sail the Oreto out
of Liverpool on March 22, 1862.59 The Oreto sailed to Nassau in the West Indies where
the ship was armed and renamed the Florida.60 Bulloch‘s gamble was a success. On the
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other hand, the Florida was seized at Nassau in the summer of 1862, under the suspicion
that she was waiting to be armed, news that pleased Secretary of State William Seward
immensely. 61 Unfortunately, there was not enough evidence to hold the ship and so the
Florida was released. Hotze used this and subsequent victories of the Florida as
propaganda, reporting in his Index that
a mob of discharged sailors and others were employed to transship cargo from a
schooner into the Oreto. I am credibly informed that about half an hour after they
got on board the Oreto she put to sea, and in about three hours afterwards overtook
the British schooner Prince Alfred, said to have been lately purchased… [after
towing the Prince Alfred to a small island in the Bahamas] the men [of the Oreto]
began to take out of the Prince Alfred her cargo and to put it on board the Oreto.
They discharged six 32-pounded broadside guns and two 68-pouder pivot guns,
lots of stores, shot, shell, and powder. This took six days to do, when the Oreto,
having these guns mounted on her deck, weighed anchor, hoisted the Confederate
flag, her crew manning the rigging and giving three cheers. 62
Hotze‘s report on the triumphs of the Florida serves as an example of the
Confederacy‘s success in outwitting Union efforts to prevent the Southern states from
gaining munitions and ships. Hotze continued to report on the Florida‘s movements
during the war, citing an instance where the ship sneaked into the port of Mobile,
Alabama to resupply. Also, the Florida continued to capture more ships. Hotze later
related how the Florida captured and burned a ship called the Star of Peace, bound from
Calcutta, India to Boston, Massachusetts.63 The value of the captured cargo was
60
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$500,000.64 The Florida‘s capture of another Federal schooner was further proof that the
Confederacy now had the naval capability to successfully raid and capture Union
vessels. 65 Hotze used this propaganda to bolster his claim that the Confederacy was a
viable military power with a chance of victory. However, the Florida was captured by
the USS Wachusett on October 7, 1864, in the Bay of San Salvador, Brazil without a shot
having been fired.66 The Florida had been at sea since sneaking out of the port of Brest,
France eight months earlier, and during this time at sea, the Florida captured a total of
thirteen prizes.67 The Florida‘s captain had sailed into port to get more fuel and supplies,
but was pounced upon by the Wachusett. 68
Despite losing their chance at stopping the Oreto before it sailed and became the
Florida, both Adams and Dudley were determined to prevent Bulloch‘s next ship from
being launched. The 290 was constructed in the John Laird and Company‘s Birkenhead
Ironworks, a shipyard that had been in business since 1829 and was said to be more
powerful than her sister vessel. 69 Bulloch, who kept an ear to the ground for news from
the British government concerning any possible intervention, reported that Lord Russell
seemed ―more determined than ever to preserve its neutrality...[and] the chances of
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getting a vessel to sea in anything like fighting condition are next to impossible.‖ 70
Bulloch knew that his plan to get the 290 out of British waters had to be top-notch, for
both Dudley and Adams were investigating the various shipyards in an effort to discover
Bulloch‘s plans. Bulloch moved the 290 into a private graving dock in an effort to
continue her construction unimpeded. Weeks of surveillance by Dudley and his network
led to the discovery that the 290 was already under construction, and Dudley reported to
the Union State Department on April 4, 1862 that the ship was a ―gunboat of eleven
hundred tons [and] was the exact model of the Florida, with engines of three hundred
horsepower.‖71 Dudley also reported that he had heard that the Spanish government had
contracted the ship‘s construction, but he doubted the claim. Upon making inquiries at
the Spanish embassy, Adams found that the ambassador there knew nothing about it.72
Dudley further discovered that two Confederate officers who had served on the Sumter
confirmed that the 290 was indeed meant for service in the Confederacy. 73 After further
investigation, Dudley confidently reported to Seward that ―[The 290] will be when
finished a very superior boat…The order when given was to build her of the very best
material and in the best & strongest manner without regard to expence and the foreman
says this has been done….There is no doubt but what she is intended for the Rebels.‖74
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This evidence became part of the case that both Dudley and Adams presented to the
British government in an attempt to prevent the 290 from being launched.
The Union agents repeatedly attempted to stop the 290 from sailing, searching for
any evidence that Bulloch was breaking the Foreign Enlistment Act or that the ship was
legally owned by the Confederacy. Adams and Dudley also pressured Lord Russell to
act, hoping that they had gathered enough evidence to prove that the 290 was meant to
serve the Confederacy, and if permitted to launch, would violate British neutrality.
However, their case relied heavily on hearsay evidence, and there was a lack of
documented wrongdoing. 75 Adams insisted that Lord Palmerston‘s ministry abide by its
declaration of neutrality and stop Bulloch.76 Russell debated whether or not to prevent
the launching of the 290 until the matter was legally clarified, or until Adams and Dudley
produced more evidence. As with the Florida, customs officers inspected the 290 and
reported that while there were powder canisters, no guns or gun carriages were seen. 77
After the inspection was completed, the customs office stated that there was not enough
evidence, physical or otherwise to justify the seizure of the 290, nor was there evidence
to support the claim that the ship was destined to become a Confederate war vessel. 78
Thus, Russell took no action.
The 290 launched on May 15, 1862, and seemed likely to clear Liverpool by midJuly, setting course for international waters.79 Those plans were delayed, however, when
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on June 23, Adams tried yet again to convince Russell to prevent the 290 from sailing,
asking for a warrant to have the ship seized. This time Adams supplied circumstantial
information gathered through Dudley‘s spy network, including a number of testimonials
and evidence gathered through his team of private lawyers that indicated the ship had
indeed been built as a warship for the Confederacy. 80 Russell, however, still was not
convinced. Dudley finally succeeded in fulfilling Lord Russell‘s demands by submitting
sworn depositions from Liverpool customs agents, and so demanded the 290’s seizure. 81
Both Adams and the British Foreign Office reminded Lord Russell that if the 290
was allowed to sail, it might be seen as a declaration of support for the Confederacy,
which would violate the Queen‘s proclamation of neutrality and even lead to an
undesired war with the United States, but to Adams‘ and Dudley‘s frustration, Lord
Russell did not order the ship to be seized. 82 Lord Russell attempted to justify his delay
in issuing an arrest warrant, asserting that Britain wished to remain the Union‘s friend but
also wanted to remain neutral in the conflict by not acting in a manner that might be seen
as friendly to one side.

Needless to say, the Union was not pleased with this

explanation. 83
Adams and Dudley continued to demand the seizure of the 290, but the British
Board of Customs refused. To make matters worse, the paperwork submitted by the two
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Union agents had been misplaced, and this, in turn, significantly lowered the chances of
Union success. 84 In addition to the misplacement of papers, the examination of the
gathered evidence took quite a long time. 85
While the British government was scrambling to recover the misplaced papers
and thoroughly examine the evidence, Bulloch quickly acted to remove the 290 from
British waters. Bulloch sailed the ship, under tugboat escort, for a purported trial cruise
on the Mersey River. By the time that Dudley realized that Bulloch had pulled off a hoax
of massive proportions, it was too late to stop the ship and the 290, successfully escaped
Britain on July 29, 1862, just a few weeks later than originally planned.86 As had
happened with the Florida, Lord Russell was out of town when the ship escaped British
waters. Although his actions gave him an alibi, Lord Russell‘s actions did not bolster his
claims to uphold British neutrality. Dudley wrote to Seward that he feared British public
support for the Union had declined, in part due to General George McClellan‘s losses in
the Peninsular Campaign and his failure to capture Richmond; Dudley opined that
McClellan‘s military losses had ―caused the feeling in this country [Britain] against the
United States and in favor of the South to break out afresh and with increasing
virulence…. Those who pretended to be neutral now show themselves in their favor…
The current is against us and it is strong and threatens to carry everything with it.‖ 87
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Hotze trumpeted the Confederate victories and the escape of the 290. In The Index on
October 30, 1862, the Confederate propagandist commented that the 290
has disturbed and altogether unsettled the Federal public… this vessel, which is
worthy of being the successor of the Sumter, has played such havoc with the
Federal marine, that the rate of insurance has increased 5 per cent. It is this
apparent that the commerce as well as the territory of the North is vulnerable. If
privateering should be facilitated by the Confederate Congress, the north will find
its trade completely crippled.88
Hotze hoped that if the 290 was successful, it might aid the Confederate goal to gain
British recognition.
After escaping from Liverpool, Bulloch had the 290 anchor off the northern coast
of Ireland, whereupon he arranged for the transport of Raphael Semmes and his crew to
the Confederate ship along with nineteen cases of goods.89 Semmes, his crew, and the
shipment of supplies reached the 290 on August 20, 1862, and Semmes raised
Confederate colors five days later, more than prepared to begin raiding Union ships. The
290 sailed for the Azores Islands, where she was armed and rechristened the Alabama.
During her career, the Alabama captured over sixty-six Union vessels and caused more
than $5 million worth of losses to the Union merchant marine trade in a two-year span,
taking the most prizes of any Confederate raider. 90 It seemed once again that Bulloch
and, by extension, the Confederacy, had outwitted the Union, slipping a powerful warship
out of Liverpool while Adams and Dudley were tied up in bureaucratic red tape.
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The Alabama menaced the high seas for two years, and Hotze continued to
broadcast the ship‘s successes and refute accusations that the Alabama was knowingly
violating Britain‘s neutrality by seizing British ships. He remarked in the November 6,
1862, issue of The Index that there
is not a shadow of a pretence for the allegation that Captain Semmes has violated
any neutral rights. He has not knowingly destroyed any British property, even on
board the enemy‘s ships; if he has done so unwittingly, England must demand
reparation, and the Confederate States must accord it.91
Hotze did his utmost to ensure that the Confederacy‘s image was as untarnished as
possible, declaring that accusations that the Confederacy was acting dishonorably by
capturing British vessels were false. Hotze heralded the integrity of Semmes, declaring
that the captain was not a man who would ever violate British neutrality. 92 Hotze‘s
declaration that the Alabama was indeed obeying international law was also used to
discredit Northern cruisers. For example, Hotze related an incident in which the British
ship Blanche was halted off the coast of Cuba by a Union man-of-war; the Blanche tried
to escape, whereupon the Union ship gave chase, captured the Blanche, and set her
afire.93
The successful escape of the Alabama, combined with British Foreign Secretary
Lord Palmerston‘s refusal to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Confederate warship,
deeply upset some northerners. Many wrote to their local newspapers condemning
Britain for allowing a Confederate ship not only to be built within her borders, but then
91
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allowing that vessel to escape unscathed. One anonymous writer to the New York Herald
on October 10, 1862, questioned: ―Is this the neutrality which the British government
proclaimed? Is this friendship which it manifests towards a nation with whom it
professes to be on terms of peace and animity [sic]? ...It is easier to deal with an open
enemy than with a concealed one.‖ 94 Many northerners could not fathom why Britain
allowed a Confederate agent to build two ships in her shipyards and then permitted those
ships to sail out of Liverpool to attack Union ships. There was great bitterness over what
some considered to be Britain‘s betrayal.
The downfall of the Alabama occurred in 1864 when she got into a battle with the
USS Kearsarge off the coast of France. The Alabama was in a dilapidated state, and
Semmes knew that his ship needed to resupply, so he chose Cherbourg as the site at
which to undergo repairs. 95 While waiting for permission to enter the harbor and go into
dry-dock, the Kearsage sailed into view. The ships battled on June 19, 1864, in a dueling
fashion, with each ship‘s guns facing the other. 96 In less than an hour, the Alabama was
destroyed, and her survivors were rescued by the Kearsarge, and a number of other
spectator vessels. 97 When the survivors of the Alabama arrived in Southampton, they
were given a rousing welcome, with the London Standard commenting, ―Every TRUE
Englishman will regret to learn that the gallant Alabama has gone to her last resting
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place.‖98 When word reached the Union of the Alabama’s downfall, celebrations and
parades broke out, and The New York Times discussed the ship‘s sinking for several
weeks following the battle.99
Up to her valiant fight to the finish, the Alabama was quite a morale-booster for
the Confederacy. 100 Hotze made sure to publish every capture and victory by the
Alabama, and he desperately tried to use her victories to convince the British government
and populace that the Confederacy would be victorious and thus deserved British
recognition and support. The warm welcome given to the crew of the Alabama upon
their arrival in Southampton indicated that the exploits of the Alabama had excited the
imagination of the British people, and in winning their support, Hotze‘s propaganda
efforts obviously achieved some success. But even though some of the British populace
cheered on the Alabama, this support was certainly not enough to sway the position of the
British government in regard to the American Civil War. By this point, Britain seemed
determined to maintain her neutrality, a position she would defend throughout the
remainder of the war. The victories of a few ships were not enough; in all probability,
only consistent major Confederate victories over the Union, perhaps combined with other
economic incentives might have had a chance to bring about the much desired diplomatic
recognition; thus Hotze‘s propaganda efforts were in vain.
Although the actions of the Alabama, and to a lesser degree, the Florida, led to
increased tensions between the Union and Great Britain, they were not enough to alienate
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the two permanently. Following the war, Secretary of State Seward, arguing that Britain
had failed to maintain her neutrality by not preventing the Alabama from sailing, insisted
upon a British apology and some land concessions (at first parts of Canada, then later, the
Bahamas) as reparations for the Alabama’s damages to Union shipping. 101 Seward was
unsuccessful in getting Britain to agree to his demands, and it was not until President
Ulysses Grant‘s administration that an agreement was reached. In 1871, the claims of
both sides were submitted to a tribunal in Geneva, and after much delay and argument by
both sides the tribunal announced on September 14, 1872, that Britain owed the Union
$15.5 million, including interest, for the damage caused by the Alabama and her sister
ships.102
When the Civil War ended with the Union victorious over the Confederacy, Great
Britain was still neutral. The exploits of propagandists, spies, and ships such as the
Florida and the Alabama were not enough to bring about the recognition the Confederacy
so desperately sought.
Hotze was a brilliant propagandist, but he was often short of funds. This affected
his ability to hire spies and publish additional propaganda. Further efforts by James
Bulloch to secure additional naval vessels for the Confederacy ended in failure, and the
two ironclad rams he did commission in 1863 were seized and then bought by the British
government. Clearly, the Union anger over the Florida and especially the Alabama did
influence the British government to be more careful about living within the bounds of its
proclaimed neutrality. Nevertheless, if the Confederacy had been able to win at
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, which surely would have been touted by its diplomats and
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propagandists, British recognition and aid might have been possible. However, the
turning of the tide in favor of the Union that occurred in 1862 in Great Britain, and in
July 1863 in the United States, put an end to any Confederate hope of British support.
With moral issue of slavery still looming, and now the eventual defeat of the
Confederacy becoming more certain, Great Britain was not going to jeopardize her
stability, profits, and reputation by granting the Confederacy recognition and support.
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Conclusion
When the Civil War ended, Henry Hotze faded from public view. He never
returned to America, but he may have continued to write, for his obituary mentioned that
he received ―various decorations from foreign governments for services as a publicist.‖1
That suggests that he had not limited himself as just a propagandist for the Confederate
States of America. Hotze died in Zug, Switzerland on April 19, 1887.2
Until the end of war, Adams, Dudley and Morse continued to gather information
for the Union. Sanford, too, continued to gather information from his post in Belgium.
Charles Francis Adams served as the American Ambassador to Great Britain until 1868,
after which he returned to America and became a member of the Board of Overseers of
Harvard University; he died in Boston on November 21, 1886. Following the end of the
Civil War, Thomas Haines Dudley returned to his native New Jersey, and built a large
house on an estate near Camden, where he maintained his involvement in Republican
Party politics; he died in Philadelphia of a heart attack on April 15, 1893.3 Freeman
Harlowe Morse served as U.S. consul to London until 1870, but he never returned to the
United States following his retirement; he died in Surbiton, Surrey, England on February
5, 1891.4
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As these men faded from public view, so too did some of their activities fade in
public memory. As time passed, so did the memories of the propagandists and their
efforts. Both the Union and the Confederacy attempted to convince the British
government and people that theirs was the side to support as they battled during the
American Civil War. Both sides used propaganda – in the forms of pamphlets,
newspaper articles, and magazines, information gathering, dissemination, disinformation,
and essays. Even though the Union diplomats arrived only shortly before those of the
Confederacy, the Union had a history of diplomatic relations with Britain, and those
relationships served that nation well. It also had established access to the British media.
The Confederacy, on the other hand, had to start from scratch.
Besides Adams, Sanford, Dudley, and Morse, the Union agents included
Secretary of State William Seward‘s four-man commission, in particular the wily
Thurlow Weed, Seward‘s former campaign manager. The Union had more money and
used it to hire private agents and detectives to gather information, to print pro-Union
articles in British and Continental newspapers, and to support its cause. The Confederacy
was often short of funds, but managed to conduct quite a propaganda campaign despite
that. The major Confederate agents included James Mason and John Slidell, the two
Confederate ambassadors to Europe, with Mason assigned to Great Britain and Slidell to
France, and former Union naval officer James Dunwoody Bulloch, and Major James
Caleb Huse. However, without a doubt, the outstanding propaganda agent on either side
was Henry Hotze, the brilliant journalist, who devised a campaign to sway British public
opinion to the Confederate side.
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President Jefferson Davis and other officials in the Confederacy began the war
fully expecting diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain. The primary
reason behind this expectation was cotton. The American South had long been the
primary global producer of raw cotton, and her primary market was Great Britain, with its
huge textile industry. Davis and others believed that recognition would pave the way for
commercial treaties and alliances; furthermore, they believed that once Great Britain
granted recognition to the Confederacy, much of the rest of Europe would follow,
facilitating the purchase of critical war supplies, weapons, food, and even uniforms.
Some in the Confederacy even believed that Great Britain would have to militarily
intervene if the Union blockade interfered with the shipments of Confederate cotton to
Great Britain. In fact, the Confederacy was so certain that its cotton was the key to
gaining British recognition that it instituted a cotton embargo. The embargo was meant
to oblige the British government to show its support for the Confederacy. What the
Confederacy apparently failed to consider was the effect of the embargo on the
Confederacy itself.
Things did not work out as the Confederacy thought that they would. British
recognition did not come quickly, and the Confederacy soon recognized that it would
have to do more to convince the British government to grant the sought-after recognition.
One tactic was propaganda. After establishing a permanent minister in Great Britain –
James Mason – the Confederacy sent Henry Hotze there to establish and operate its
propaganda machine. Hotze‘s Index was a masterly mouthpiece. In the Index, Hotze
published articles, quoted statistics, made observations, and generally published
everything he could that was favorable to the Confederacy and unfavorable to the Union.
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The Union also resorted to propaganda, but not necessarily to make Great Britain
intervene on its side. The Union preferred that Great Britain remain neutral, and this
meant that the British government would not officially or unofficially support the
Confederacy.
There was thus a propaganda war in Great Britain as Union and Confederate
agents attempted to influence the British. The stakes were high: should Great Britain
grant recognition to the Confederacy, it could mean a shift in the momentum of the war,
and in the early years of the war, the momentum already seemed to be on the side of the
Confederacy.
When the Confederacy decided to have ships purchased or built in Great Britain
that could be used in the war with the Union, the Union became quite concerned. That
concern increased when the Confederacy sent James Bulloch to Britain to negotiate
contracts to have two warships built. The two warships, the Oreto, later renamed the
Florida and the 290, later renamed the Alabama, sailed out of English shipyards despite
strong attempts by Union representatives to stop them from doing so. Together, the two
ships captured almost eighty Union vessels and captured hundreds of thousands of dollars
of cargo. Hotze gleefully reported on every victory of both ships, using them to capture
the imagination – and, he hoped, active support - of the British people. He disseminated
the stories to show that the Confederacy could still win the war. But he could not
convince the British government to abandon its neutral stance.
In the end, what impact did the intense propaganda employed by both the Union
and the Confederacy have in Great Britain? British society remained divided in its
support of the Union or the Confederacy, and while there were some in the British
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government who vigorously supported the Confederates, most preferred to remain neutral
rather than risk ending up on the losing side of the American conflict. It appears that
neither the Union‘s nor the Confederacy‘s propaganda had much of an effect in changing
those sentiments. Despite all of its propaganda efforts, the Confederacy was ultimately
unable to convince the British government to grant it the diplomatic recognition it so
desperately sought. As the Civil War began, Great Britain maintained its neutrality, and
when the Civil War ended, Great Britain still maintained its neutrality.
Does this mean that the Union‘s propaganda efforts were successful, especially
given that the Union goal was to convince Great Britain to remain neutral? The answer is
apparently ―No.‖ All evidence supports the fact that Great Britain remained neutral
because it was in her best interests to do so. Great Britain was making huge profits by
selling war supplies to both sides, and since it had built up a large cotton surplus prior to
the outbreak of the Civil War, it resisted Confederate pressure for recognition.
Furthermore, Great Britain was quite reluctant to become involved in an internal and
unpredictable American conflict. Finally, had Britain supported one or the other side,
support could have led to intervention, and that could have destabilized Great Britain
internally and also destabilized her relationship with Europe and the rest of the world.
Thus, despite all of the pressure tactics employed by both the Union and the Confederacy,
they had temporary or minimal effects. In the end, the Confederacy never gained that
sought after recognition, and Britain‘s choice to remain neutral most likely stemmed from
internal rather than Union pressure. Great Britain‘s actions were based on its
determination to do what was best for its long-term interests, and no amount of
propaganda could alter that determination.
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